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ABSTRACT
In 1954 the Air Force decided to locate two air bases in 
North Dakota. After deciding on locations at Fargo and 
Bismarck, the Air Force then changed the locations to Grand 
Forks and Minot. The decision created an uproar in the state 
as each major city fought to receive a base. Another 
controversy erupted over the site selection within Grand 
Forks County when the Air Force changed the locations from 
its original choice.
A wide variety of research sources were used in the 
the paper. The papers of United States Senator Milton R. 
Young were extensively used. Government documents in the 
form of court cases, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers documents, 
and Congressional were greatly utilized. The author examined 
numerous newspapers and conducted many personal interviews.
A large number of secondary sources were also employed, 
including numerous books and articles on the development of 
the Air Force in the 1950's.
Based upon its required mission and goal at that time, 
the Air Force selected the correct sites in North Dakota 
for the two air bases. The controversy broke out as each 
North Dakota city competed for a base and the Air Force 
failed to explain all the factors in selecting each site.
x
CHAPTER 1
THE AIR FORCE IN TRANSITION, 1946-1956
Many elements led to the creation and the site selection 
of Grand Forks and Minot Air Force bases in North Dakota in 
1954. Although these bases were constructed, in the mid- 
1950's, their roots extended as far back as the immediate 
post-World War II years. Both bases were part of an overall 
defense plan rather than isolated projects. The growth and 
transition of the Air Force, with its Air Defense and Air 
National Guard components, greatly influenced the establish­
ment of the Norrh Dakota air bases. The development of an 
automated radar system was equal-O'' important. The automated 
system would become the center of the two bases. This 
chapter examines briefly the foundation of the bases— the 
growth of the Air Force and the development of an automated 
radar system.
During the post-World War II era the United States began 
a concerted effort to upgrade its defensive military 
capabilities. The Air Force became the primary recipient of 
increased funding and congressional support. The congress­
ional and Air Force leaders were apprehensive with each new 
development in Soviet military technology. Fearing a mass 
nuclear bomb raid on the country, the Air Fcice initiated a
i
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series of defense measures to detect and prevent a possible 
attack.
The danger on the horizon appeared closer as the Soviet 
Union produced more of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress copy­
cats, the Tupolev 4 Bull, and later, the faster Type-31 
bomber. In 1943 the U.S. had landed three B-29 bombers at 
Vladivostock, U.S s.R.. The Soviets kept the B-29s copying 
the design and use- it as their main long-range bomber 
force. The Soviets had an estimated 1,300 TU-4s and over two 
hundred Type-31 bombers in 1953.1 Both aircraft could easily 
reach locations in the U.S. from air bases in the northern 
Soviet Union at the Chukotsk Peninsula, Novosibirsk, or 
Severnaya Zemlya.
The shadow of Pearl Harbor, with its destruction from 
unreadiness, hung heavily in the memories of the Air Force. 
Post-war planning had to prevent another surprise attack.
The feelings of the military as a whole were summed up by 
U.S. Army General Omar Bradley, "I firmly believe that if a 
third World War should start, that it would start by an 
attack on the United States." Furthermore, Bradley felt the 
war would start "very much like the last war started, as far 
as we were concerned, by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor."
Meanwhile, it was estimated that within one hour of 
being notified, 10 percent of the Strategic Air Command's 
(SAC) Convair B-36 Peacemaker and Boeing B-47 Stratojet 
bombers could become airborne. The percentage increased to
3
50 percent with two hours and 90 percent with three hours 
notice. In 1950 the warning time of an impending attack was 
less than one hour. The kill rate also depended upon the 
amount of advanced notice.3 The best estimates put the rate 
at 15 to 20 percent during a day attack but less than 5 
percent at night.
The concern that the Soviet Union would be heading down 
from the Artie at any moment, ready to destroy the nation, 
reached a high point in 1953. Popular magazines such as 
Colliers and Fortune carried articles that featured mass 
attack scenarios in which eleven to thirty-five million U.S. 
citizens would perish and the U.S. would be destroyed as a 
world power.4 While such articles might appear to be out of 
the norm, in reality they portrayed the general consensus 
among the military and government that such a disasterous 
attack could happen, as conveyed by General Bradley's 
statements.
Successful air defense depended on sufficient warning 
time to launch a counter-attack. The interceptor force 
required adequate time to be alerted and make the inter­
ception. SAC needed the time to get its bombers and refuel­
ing tankers off the ground and out of danger. But in 1947 
the severe deficiency in early warning radar detection 
around the U.S. limited the high ratio of defense kills and 
surviving SAC aircraft. The radar perimeter fence around the 
country then consisted primarily of the General Electric
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CPS-6B and Bendix FPS-3 radars. The range on both extended 
no more than two hundred miles, while the average effective 
range approximated 150 miles.5 With such a short detection 
distance, warning time would be much too short. To further 
complicate matters, radar range functioned better at high 
altitude but could not operate at lower altitude, which 
provided £ safe path for enemy bombers. The earth's curva­
ture and mountains also caused "dead-space" where the radar 
could not reach.
Another problem that faced the Air Force involved the 
large amount of time wasted in detection and interception in 
what became known as the Manual System. When, and if, the 
radar detected the enemy, the radar controller wasted 
valuable time by mathematically computing coordinates and 
passing the information on to a higher command, using 
unreliable communications equipment. At each radar station 
exhaustive mathematical computations were required to plot 
the unknown "blip1 on the screen. As a result of constantly 
monitoring the radar screen and computing math problems, 
controllers suffered fatigue and made frequent mistakes.
The higher commands also wasted more time plotting the 
course and relaying the information to the interceptors. 
Under such circumstances a saturation raid, as expected by 
the Department of Defense, would quickly overload the radar 
system and cause a breakdown. While the interceptors knew 
the general direction of the enemy, they did not know the
5
exact location.
In 1950 the existing radar system and its method of 
interception could notify the military of a Soviet attack 
but would leave little time for action before the bombers 
flew overhead. Prior to the establishment of several radar 
lines in Canada by 1955, the network consisted of several 
thin and widely distributed radar screens around the 
country. The Air Force would have less than thirty minutes 
to intercept the bombers. A Soviet mass attack of TU-4 and 
Type-31 bombers would be at the edge of the U.S. before the 
CPS-6B and FPS-3 radars picked them up. The northern radar 
network with stations, such as Minot Air Force Station,
North Dakota, could reach approximately one hundred fifty 
miles north to the 50th parallel. The TU-4, capable of 420 
mph, and the Type-31, capable of 460 mph, would be in the 
U.S. within minutes after detection.
Furthermore, the northern border, the most obvious route 
of a Soviet attack because of its shorter flight path, did 
not have an adequate fighter interceptor force in place to 
meet the attack. In a concentration of air bases in the 
northeast and Washington the Air Force had only two air 
defense bases, Great Falls in Montana and Oscoda in 
Michigan, to guard the northern perimeter. The Soviet 
bomners would be free to fly into the heartland through 
North Dakota to attack SAC bases and populated areas.
Faced with such a grim picture and a growing Soviet air
6
power, the Air Force took a three-way approach to defend the 
country against the impending attack. First, the existing 
base structure would be expanded from forty-five wings in 
1948 to a proposed 143 wings in 1951.5 Second, the abilities 
of the Air Defense Command (ADC) would be strengthened 
concurrently with the increase in wing strength. Third, the 
feeble radar detection system would be completely upgraded 
into a continent-wide radar detection and interception 
system. Among other things, these reactions would result in 
the establishment of both Grand Forks and Minot Air Force 
bases in 1954.
These actions were accompanied by a 300 to 400 percent 
increase in the Air Force budget between the years 1950 and 
1957. In 1950 the Air Force received $4.7 billion, but 
following the outbreak of the Korean War this figure climbed 
to $22.3 billion by 1952. As a reflection of the "New Look" 
and an end to the war, the Air Force received only $11.4 
billion jn 1954, but by 1957 funds had increased to $17.7 
billion.7
At the end of World War II the Army Air Force had 1,895 
installations world-wide of which 1,333 were in the United 
States. By the end of 1948, following rapid de-mobilization 
and separation from the Army, the Air Force had 290 
installations, with 112 in the United States. Of these 112, 
ninety were active.8 In July 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) recommended an increase of wing size to seventy, but
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in October .Congress authorized only forty-eight. This was an 
increase of only three wings over the existing forty-five.
As the Air Force consolidated its forces, the total number 
of installations continued to drop, descending to one hund­
red eighty by the end of 1948.9
In response to the 1949 explosion of an atomic bomb by 
the Soviets, in 1950 the JCS recommended another increase to 
ninety-five wings by June 1953. President Harry Truman con­
curred but moved the completion date forward to 1952.
Between 1950-53 the selection, construction, or reutili­
zation of existing structures became a major task. The rise 
in construction costs led Truman to insist upon the utili­
zation of any existing facility if the. mission requirements 
could be met. The Air Force contemplated using inactivated 
World War II bases but found most of them unsuitable for the 
modern jet age. Many were in locations too close to populat­
ed areas or did not permit expanding base facilities. The 
new jet aircraft required longer runways and more clearance 
around the base than most World War II installations could 
provide.
The National Security Council (NSC) and the JCS advised 
the President of the need to expand airpower to deter war.
On 18 October 1951 the Air Force received authorization to 
expand to 143 wings with the base structure to be in place 
by 1 January 1955. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force 
Chief of Staff, stated that the origin of the 143-wing
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program came from of four developments: the development of 
the atomic bomb by the Soviet Union in August 1949; the 
Communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950; the commit­
ment of the United States to join the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization; and the calculation by the JCS that by the 
middle of 1954 the Soviets would be able to launch an attack 
against the United States.10
When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in 1952 and 
the Republican party gained control of Congress, a new 
direction in the Air Force build-up took place. Eisenhower 
ran on a platform of economy and a balanced budget. In 
February 1953 Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson froze 
construction until "each project had been reviewed and 
specifically cleared by the Secretary of the Air Force, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Bureau of the Budget."11 
Furthermore, the essential projects would employ strict 
use of economy. As a result of the decrease, construction 
was deferred on fourteen U.S. bases and six overseas. In May 
1953 while waiting for the results of the review, the Air 
Force established an "interim" program of 120 wings in place 
of the 143. The 120 were to be in place by mi.d-1956.
While many within the Air Force disagreed with the 120- 
wing program, General Lee Washbourne, Director of Installa­
tions, stated that the program would "represent a very sub­
stantial increase in the combat strength of the Air Force." 
He went on to say, "In addition to achieving this active
9
force, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve will 
have substantially increased quantities of first-class air­
craft available."12
The new JCS met in Washington, D.C., in July 1953 to 
discuss the overall milit ry budget. On 12 August the 
Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb. In response the 
JCS recommended an increase in airpower. In December 1953 
the Eisenhower administration increased the 120-wing program 
to 137 which gradually replaced the projected goal of 143. 
The "New Look" in military planning was designed for the 
long-term military scenario rather than viewing 1954 as 
D-Day. On 10 June 1953 Eisenhower stated that the defense 
policy of the future could not be "a mere repetition of 
today's reflex to yesterday's crisis."13 The 137-wing 
program placed increased emphasis on protecting the 
continental U.S. and the massive nuclear retailitory force 
of SAC. In the 137-wing program five new sites were 
announced including the "Fargo area, North Dakota." In 
addition, eight sites were to be re-activated, including the 
"Bismarck Airport, North Dakota."14
While the Air Force increased its wing size during the 
post-war period, it also responded to the Soviet threat by 
increasing the strength of the ADC. On 27 March 1946 the Air 
Force had created the Air Defense Command with the duty 
"to organize and administer the integrated air defense 
system of the continental United States."15 Congress had
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appropriated little funds, personnel, or material to carry 
out the mission, since the U.S. was the sole possessor of 
the atomic bomb, and it would be many years, it was thought, 
before the Soviet Union would produce its own. In 1946 only 
two fighter interceptor squadrons existed, the 414th Night 
Fighter Squadron at March Field, California, with no air­
craft, and the 425th Night Fighter Squadron also at March 
Field. The first east coast defense unit, established on 21 
May 1947, was the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at 
Mitchell Field, New York.16 Mitchell Field served as head 
quarters for the ADC with Lieutenant General George E. 
Stratemeyer in command.
Since the Air Force emphasized the offensive strength of 
SAC rather than the defensive capabilities of the ADC, 
General Stratemeyer decided to build a force on existing 
materials. In 1947 he stated that one of his primary goals 
was to "concentrate the bulk of all available air defense 
forces in defense of one strategic area believed at that 
time to be most subject to attack."17 Following the Soviet 
suppression of Czechoslovakia on 29 February 1948 and the 
Berlin blockade on 26 June 1948, Stratemeyer established air 
defense units in the northeast, northwest, and Los Alamos- 
Albuquerque defense areas. By early 1949, two air divisions, 
the 25th in the east and the 26th in west, had been created 
to guard the northeast and northwest.
Following the beginning of the Korean War on 25 June
11
1950, the ADC began operating on a twenty-four-hour alert 
status. The war facilitated the separation of the ADC into 
an independent command on 1 January 1951. The Air Force 
recognized the need for a single command devoted solely to 
air defense. Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead assumed 
command, and the headquarters were moved to Colorado 
Springs, Colorado. The ADC divided the country into three 
geographic areas, the Eastern Air Defense Forces with 
headquarters at Mitchell Field, New York, the Central Air 
Defense Forces with headquarters at Kansas City, Missouri, 
and the Western Air Defense Forces with Headquarters at 
Hamilton AFB, California.18 On 1 September 1954 further 
reorganization took place with the creation of the 
Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) with General 
Benjamin W. Chidlaw in command. CONAD integrated all three 
service organizations devoted to air defense— ADC, Navy 
radar ships and aircraft, and the Army anti-aircraft 
weapons— into one command.
Besides operational changes, the ADC underwent a period 
of rapid expansion. Following the Soviet explosion of the 
hydrogen bomb, the Air Force increased ADC wings by five.
In the 137-wing Air Force, Congress approved the establish­
ment of six ADC bases along the northern border, tentatively 
this would include: the Fargo area and Bismarck Airport, 
North Dakota; Klamath Falls, Oregon; Glasgow area, Montana; 
K.I. Sawyer Airport, Michigan; and the Cadillac area,
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Michigan.19 By 1955 the Air Force had fifty-six ADC wings of 
which half occupied their own base.
After expanding to fifty-six wings, the Air Force chose 
to decrease the size of the ADC. By 30 June 1959 Congress 
authorized only twenty-seven ADC wings and, by 1960 only 
twenty-five. Several reasons precipitated the decline. 
First, the high costs of maintaining an active interceptor 
force and newer aircraft forced a decline in operations.
The ADC's budget had doubled from $150 million in 1955 to 
$305 million in 1958.21 As the bills began to add up, 
Congress became increasingly concerned. The Air Force, 
accustomed to spending $350,000 for the F-86 or $700,000 for 
the F-94, had to face a price tag of $3.3 million for the 
top of the line interceptor, the F-106. Second, the 
capabilities of the new aircraft and weapons permitted a 
greater area of operations allowing some air defense units 
to be phased-out. Third, the successful launch of the Soviet 
Sputnik I in October 1957 proved that the Soviet Union had 
concentrated its efforts into the inter-continental 
ballistic missiles (ICBM) program. The Soviet Union had not 
built the projected number of new advanced bombers which the 
Department of Defense had estimated, but, instead, directed 
their efforts into developing the ICBM. Fourth, the growing 
strength of the Air National Guard presented a viable and 
cheap interceptor force. Since its establishment in April 
1946, the ANG had become an integral component of air
13
defense.
Congress created the ANG with the primary mission of air 
defense. The ADC held the responsibility to "maintain units 
of the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve in a highly 
trained operational condition of readiness."22 Unfortunate­
ly, the states maintained a tight control ever the units and 
did not permit the effective integration into the active Air 
Force. By 1947 thirty ANG squadrons had become active, 
including the 178th Fighter Squadron at Fargo, North Dakota, 
with seven of the thirty squadrons theoretically operating 
under the ADC.23 Following the outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950, the relationship between the ANG and the Air Force 
began to change. On 10 February 1951 twenty-one ANG squad­
rons were federalized, raising the number of air defense 
squadrons from twenty-one to forty-two. Federalization per­
mitted the ANG squadrons to be trained on modern jet air­
craft. The ADC subsequently returned the squadrons to the 
states in November and December 1952.
In December 1952 the 138th Fighter Interceptor Squadron 
(FIS) at Hancock Field, New York, and the 194th FIS at 
Hayward, California, became the first ANG squadrons to main­
tain an alert status.24 On 18 May 1953 the ADC submitted a 
plan for thirteen additional ANG squadrons to be on the 
alert program, among these were the 175th FIS at Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota, and the 178th FIS at Fargo.25 In 
November 1953 the number of ANG squadrons increased to
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seventy with nineteen FIS and fifty-one squadrons assuming a 
dual fighter-bomber role. It was not until 15 August 1954 
that a full-scale alert program commenced which still
included the 178th at Fargo. Nineteen squadrons, including
2 6the 178th, also maintained permanent alert status. On 1 
July 1956 the ADC designated all seventy ANG combat squad­
rons "Fighter Interceptor squadrons".
The Air Force, in conjunction with the build-up in ADC 
wings, sought to improve its manned interception force. 
During World War II the Northrop P-61 Black Widow served as 
the Army Air Force night fighter, but by 1950 the Air Force 
still did not have an all-weather jet aircraft in its inven­
tory. The Air Force decided in 1950 to procure a number of 
all-weather interceptors as part of an "interim" program 
before receiving advance interceptors in the late 1950's.27 
Later that year the Air Force began to receive the improved 
all-weather Lockheed F-94C Starfire. In 1951 the Northrop 
F-89 Scorpion came into the aircraft inventory and in 1953 
the North American F-86D Sabre. By the end of 1954 fifty- 
five squadrons were equipped with all-weather interceptors. 
In 1955 the Air Force began procurement of the McDonnell 
F-101 Voodoo long-range interceptor. By 1956 the "ultimate" 
interceptor, the Convair F-106 Delta Dart, began production. 
The "century series" F-106 doubled the speed of the older 
aircraft and had twice the range of the F-86 and F-89.
The improvement in radar detection and interception
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represented the third step taken in response to the growing 
strength of the Soviet Union. At the end of World War II the 
U.S. had seventy Ground Control Interceptor sites known as 
the Manual System. As previously discussed the Manual System 
resulted in delays and mistakes.
In 1947 the Air Force submitted a plan for a nationwide 
radar network called SUPREMACY. The project intended to 
build-up the air defense of the country by constructing 411 
radars in the United States and Alaska at a cost of $338 
million. The plan, however, had vision but no financial 
backing.
When the Soviets seized control of Czechoslovkia,
General Carl A. Spaatz, Air Force Chief of Staff, ordered 
ADC to establish air defenses in the northeast, northwest, 
and Alaska.29 But the materials needed to accomplish the 
task did not exist. At Hanford, Washington, the ADC erected 
four sets of out-dated World War II radar systems but these
♦ *3 f )broke down within two weeks. By April 1948 only a skeleton 
of the proposed air defenses were operating in Alaska, the 
northwest, and Albuquerque areas.
Several days before the Soviets began the Berlin block­
ade in June 1948, Congress adjourned without acting on 
SUPREMACY. In the meantime, the Air Force prepared a modi­
fied program. This "crash" program intended to build a 
seventy-five radar network of permanent AN/CPS-6B and 
AN/FPS-3 radars and ten combat centers at a cost of eighty-
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six million dollars, was projected to be operational by
3 1 .1952. Construction on the permanent radar system began m  
1950 and replaced the unfunded SUPREMACY. By 1952, 75 radars 
of the permanent network were constructed, but they did not 
achieve operational status until April 1953.32
While the Air Force waited for Congressional approval of 
the modified program, the Air Force initiated Project LASHUP 
in October. LASHUP diverted funds to construct a temporary 
network of radars in the California, northeast and northwest 
areas, and around strategic areas. By mid-1950 forty-four 
LASHUP radars were complete, but after April 1955, the ADC 
dismantled LASHUP in favor of the permanent radars. In mid- 
1950 SAC bases received further radar protection as a mobile 
radar plan took effect. By 1954, 107 mobile radar sites had 
been positioned around SAC bases.33
In February 1950 the Air Force authorized the Ground 
Control Observers to monitor for low flying aircraft. The 
Ground Controllers served an important function in locating 
aircraft that were out of the radar's range. By 1957 over 
15,000 ground control posts operated with seventy percent 
active (operating at least two hours per day).34
Along with enlarging the radar network and the Gr and 
Control Observers, the Air Force began an effort t con­
struct an automated radar system designed to protect the 
country against Soviet bombers. The development of the semi­
automatic ground environment (SAGE) systev- oecame the
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"brain" in the new air defense and radar network. Event­
ually, the Air Force placed SAGE centers at both Grand Forks 
and Minot Air Force Bases. SAGE greatly reduced the time 
lapse between detection of the incoming enemy, launching of 
the intercept vehicle, and destruction of the target. SAGE 
handled the mathematical computations that were required to 
make an interception in a much shorter time than man could. 
Using digital transmission through telephone lines, rather 
than oral transmission over voice radio, the system calcu­
lated the earliest possible point of interception and the 
flight path the fighter must fly.
The SAGE process was to be only semi-automatic because 
military leaders would still make many of the decisions. As 
the radar transmitted positional data to the SAGE center, 
the data passed through a coordinate data transmitter which 
converted the data into range and bearing. The computer 
instantly plotted the course of any aircraft shown on the 
radar scope. Military aircraft would be equipped with 
electronic equipment (called Identification Friend or Foe, 
IFF) designed to identify the plane as hostile or friendly. 
Civilian aircraft filed flight plans showing their headings, 
altitude, and time of arrival, with the Civil Aeronautics 
Administration (CAA) or Military Flight Service (MFS). The 
CAA or MFS transferred this information into the SAGE 
computers.
When an unidentified plane entered an area without the
18
IFF signal, the radar monitor asked SAGE if the aircraft 
could be off course from a previously filed flight plan. The 
tracking monitor made the final decision as to whether or 
not the blip was hostile or friendly. The computer then 
requested height information from the height-finding radars 
located at the same radar stations. The computer continued 
to correlate each radar return with previous returns to 
establish a track or to identify new objects in the area.
The computer assigned each track a number of symbols which 
appeared on the screen informing the monitor whether the 
object was classified friendly or hostile, the merit or 
quality of the track, and a reference number.
If the monitor determined the 'blip' to be hostile, the 
weapons assigner immediately organized an attack. The Inter­
ceptor Director teams controlled the individual intercep­
tions. SAGE determined the best vehicle for interception but 
but the final decision rested with the director. The com­
puter then showed the time to intercept in minutes and gave 
the vector lines to indicate the initial heading of the 
interceptors. SAGE controlled the interception by feeding 
information to the aircraft via a radio "data link" located 
in the aircraft or anti-aircraft missile.
In November 1949, George E. Valley Jr., a member of the 
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, recommended a separate 
group to study the requirements of an air defense system.
On 15 December the Air Force created the Air Defense
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Scientific Engineering Committee (ADSEC). ADSEC became known 
as the Valley Committee due to the energetic efforts of 
Valley. ADSEC intended to study the current air defense 
situation, "to bring the Air Force's presently planned air 
defense system to its maximum inherit effectiveness," and 
"to develop and test a full-scale small area "model" of the 
best air defense system conceivable."35
In ADSEC's 24 October 1950 report, the committee con­
cluded that radar warning network located around strategic 
areas was out-dated and inadeguate to meet the reguirements 
of modern enemy aircraft.36 The Committee saw the same 
problems in the LASHUP and permanent radar programs that 
existed prior to the programs. The group estimated the new 
radars would only stop five to thirty percent of the in­
coming bombers. The committee commented further on the 
existing radar system, "ADSEC considers the contemporary Air 
Defense System to be lame, purblind, and idiot-like. Idiotic 
is the strongest. It makes little sense for us to strengthen 
the muscles if there is no brain."37
In response, Thomas Finletter, Secretary of the Air 
Force, directed Western Electric Company and Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in January 1951 to upgrade the existing radar 
system. The upgrade program became known as the Continental 
Air Defense System or CADS.
ADSEC also recommended that a second committee be 
created to study the air defense problem. In February 1951
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the Air Force accepted ADSEC's recommendations and created 
Project CHARLES. Wheeler Loomis from the University of 
Illinois directed the group which met from February to 
August 1951 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT). Project CHARLES underwent three phases. Phase one was 
an initial six month study effort by the MIT group to "re­
view the broad air defense problem and make recommendations 
for improving the existing system and establishing a new
O Osystem." Phase two ran concurrently with phase one and 
directed the effort toward an experimental solution of the 
air defense problems. From phase two emerged Project LINCOLN 
in July 1951. Phase three involved a research and develop­
ment program based on the findings of phases one and two. 
Phase three would result in the Cape Cod System.
Project CHARLES concluded that automation was the key to 
successful interceptions and that, while the current CADS 
program upgraded the system, it still remained insufficient. 
The group estimated that by the end of 1956 an automated 
system could encircle the U.S.. The Air Force accepted these 
recommendations and gave its approval to continue with the 
development of a prototype system. LINCOLN chose to use 
MIT's Whirlwind computer as a test-bed for the automated 
system.
MIT's Digital Computer Laboratory had already developed 
a digital computer, named Whirlwind, as a result of a Navy 
contract beginning in 1944 to develop an aircraft stability
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and control analyzer. Initially led by Nat Sage, the MIT 
group used vacuum tubes to store and retrieve information. 
Whirlwind became the first real-time digital computer which 
could meet the fast processing speed and reliability requir­
ed by any air defense system. Jay W. Forrester pioneered the 
computer and had created the random-access core memory which 
doubled the operating speed, decreased the failure rate from
. . 39two hours to two weeks, and increased the input data rate.
LINCOLN leaned heavily on the skilled personnel in the 
Whirlwind project. The group also relied on technology 
developed by the Air Force Cambridge Research Lab to trans­
mit digital information over telephone lines. The trans­
mission could provide a continuous, reliable picture of the
. . . 40radar to the main digital computer.
In October 1951 Whirlwind and Project LINCOLN combined 
into Division 6, which led to the creation of an area 
defense model, the Cape Cod System, with a computer 
directional center at Cambridge, Massachusetts, a long range 
AN/FPS-3 radar at South Truro, and fourteen smaller "gap- 
filler" radars located twenty to one hundred miles from
4 lBoston. The 6520th Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron 
used the National Guard airfield at Hanscom AFB in Bedford, 
Massachusetts, to test the system. The squadron had three 
B-29 bombers and six jet interceptors. Over five thousand 
tests were flown against the Cape Cod System.
In February 1952 Secretary Finletter gave top priority
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and funding to the development of an air defense system.
LINCOLN'S budget in the 1950's reached over twenty million 
42 .dollars a year. Later that year International Business 
Machines (IBM) received the contract to design and construct 
the SAGE computers. IBM instituted PROJECT HIGH in September 
1952 to investigate all the air defense systems that were 
being developed. IBM paid particular attention to the 
efforts of the University of Michigan's Willow Run Research 
Center which had created another automated defense system 
called the Air Defense Integrated System (ADIS). ADIS 
competed with the SAGE program until May 1953 when the Air 
Force decided on the MIT program and transferred all funds 
to the SAGE program.
In January 1953 LINCOLN published the Lincoln Transition 
System, outlining a proposed SAGE network, while IBM began 
the system design. In June 1953 IBM and Division 6 combined 
into Project GRIND. Between 24 June and 15 July 1953 IBM 
spent seven days hammering out many of the final technical 
details and problems. With many of the technical details 
solved, in September 1953 IBM received a contract to build 
two single computer prototypes, the XD-1 and the XD-2. IBM 
designed, built, and installed the computer, while the Rand 
Corporation and Systems Development Corporation created the 
master computer programs. Software had to be tailored to the 
geographic setting of each sector. American Telegraph and 
Telephone handled the digital ground communications and
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Western Electric constructed the block building.
A familiar feature in any place where SAGE operated, 
including Grand Forks and Minot AFBs, is the huge square 
block building used to house the large computers. Original­
ly proposed to go underground, the Air Force decided to 
locate the center above the ground, due to time and expense, 
in shock resistant, reinforced concrete structures.43 The 
second floor housed the duplex computers, while the first 
floor contained air cooling and support equipment. The FSQ-7 
computer had over 55,000 vacuum tubes and could store over 
one million bits of information on weapons, climate, geo­
graphy, flight paths, and all the other related inputs.44 
The third floor contained office and service rooms and the 
fourth floor housed the operational rooms. Outside the 
building, the large air conditioning units operated to main­
tain a constant temperature and humidity for the computers, 
and a three thousand kilowatt power supply unit provided a 
continuous power supply to the computers.45
At the same time that SAGE was in its infancy, a Summer 
Study Group of approximately thirty scientists met in 1952. 
The group reviewed the findings of Project LINCOLN and 
looked ac the problem of air defense in the future. The 
group concluded that in two to three years the Soviets would 
have sufficient bombers to cripple the United States. The 
best defenses that the U.S. had in existence would only stop 
20 percent of the incoming bombers.46 The group recommended
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the construction of a distant early warning (DEW) radar line 
and an automated system. The report reached the National 
Security Resources Board in September 1952 and then went to 
the NSC. The NSC recommended that the DEW line be construct­
ed at once.
The U.S. and Canada had already agreed on 10 November 
1950 to a line of thirty radars, the Pinetree line, in 
southern Canada close to the U.S.-Canadian border to be 
completed by 1953. In October 1953 the two governments 
agreed to another radar line, the mid-Canada line, along the 
55th parallel. To the north of the Mid-Canada and Pinetree 
radars, the Air Force constructed the three thousand mile 
DEW radar screen along the 69th parallel.
Before committing to the DEW project, the government 
tested a prototype system at Barter Island, Alaska, in 1953. 
The DEW line construction began in early 1955 following 
several years of negotiations with Canada and debates over 
the cost of the system. Two significant inventions made the 
DEW line possible. First, the audible alarm on radar screens 
to alert the monitors of incoming aircraft enabling the 
radars to be manned only by a few men rather than many. 
Second, reliable long-range communications to send the 
signals back to the ADC Headquarters.47 The DEW line had 
three types of radar installations, six main, twenty aux- 
liary, and twenty-eight intermediate gap-fillers located 
between Cape Dyer on Baffin Island, Canada, and Cape
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Lisburne, Alaska.48
As early as 1952 LINCOLN recommended several possible
arrangements of the automated SAGE system. The first
arrangement had the air defense sector supported by three
separate digital computers. All three computers were able to
conduct the air battle in that sector. In November 1953 ADC
modified the blueprint because of its high cost and proposed
the location of all three computers in one place with the 
. 49idea of greater input to the computers. LINCOLN rejected 
this idea because of the cost and delay in developing a 
triplex switch for the computers. It had cost over a million 
dollars to develop the duplex switch.50 LINCOLN countered by 
proposing the duplex system. The FSQ-7 would be the first 
computer to use a duplex arrangement. In a duplex set-up one 
computer remained on inactive status, while the other per­
formed the assigned tasks. The inactive computer maintained 
a continuous updated data bank in case the active computer 
malfunctioned. The geographic area covered by each direction 
center would be determined by the volume of radar input.
Using the slide-rule principle, Table 1 shows the number of
. 51heavy and gap-filler radars that were possible,
TABLE 1








22..17..12 ... 7 ... 2
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The Air Force approved the plan in December 1953, one month 
prior to the announcement of the location of the two bases 
in North Dakota. Using the relationship between heavy and 
gap-filler radars, the Air Force decided that sixteen air 
divisions with forty-six direction centers would provide 
adequate coverage.52
On 15 February 1954 the Air Force requested a revision
in the plan because of its complexity and duplicity in
certain areas from forty-six to forty-two direction centers
and sixteen to nine combat centers. The ADC approved the
decreased numbers in March 1954 and the Air Force on 17 May 
531954. By October 1954 the ADC knew exactly where and in 
what order they wanted to place the first sixteen direction 
centers and four combat centers. The plan included direction 
centers at Duluth, Minnesota, and Sioux Falls, South Dakota. 
The plan laid primary emphasis on the northeast and west 
coast followed by filling in the Great Lakes area.54
In the next few years the plan underwent more changes.
On 20 April 1955 the Air Force approved an ADC plan to cut 
the sectors from forty-two to thirty-two (plus two manually 
controlled sectors) and combat centers from nine to eight. 
This eliminated operations within Canadian territory.55 The 
new priority list included Duluth, Fargo, Sioux Falls, and 
Minot. Their priority listing were eleven, twelve, thirteen, 
and twenty-five, respectively.56
After 1956 the ADC's main worry concerned continued
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financial support of the program. The ADC had already 
experienced a contraction in the number of wings due to the 
high costs. The Air Force estimated that each SAGE center 
would cost three and half million dollars, and the total 
cost would be one and half billion dollars. On top of this 
hefty sum, the Air Force calculated that the annual tele­
phone charges at one hundred and fifty million dollars. The 
telephone companies also required the Air Force to pay $222 
million for liability charges.57 The total estimated annual 
operating cost of the SAGE system would be over four hundred 
million dollars.58
After several more revisions, delays in production, and 
a freeze from July to November 1957 in deployment, the Air 
Force determined by November 1957 that twenty-nine direction 
centers and seven combat centers would be required.59 The 
final SAGE network contained twenty-four direction centers 
and three combat centers. The SAGE network, as it appeared 
when completed, is shown on Map 1 on the following page. 
McQuire AFB became the first operational direction center in 
July 1958, On 1 July 1958 the New York Air Defense Sector 
(ADS) became operational, followed by the Boston ADS, 
Sy?.*acuse ADS, Washington ADS, and Bangor ADS.
In 1951 the central portion of the U.S. from Great 
Falls, Montana, to Oscoda, Michigan, did not have any air 
defense installations and only ten such installations 




1. S e a t t l e  ADS 13. W ashington ACS
2. Spokane ACS 14. D e tro i t  ADS
3. G reat F a lls  ADS 15. Chicago ADS
4. Minot ADS 16. tfcmtgomary AES
5. Grand Forks ADS 17. S ioux  C ity  ADS
6. D uluth ACS 18. Oklahoma ADS
7. S a u l t  S te  Marie ADS 19. Denver ADS
8. Ottowa ADS 20. Phoenix ADS
9. Bangor ADS 21. Reno ADS
10. B oston ADS 22. P o r tla n d  ADS
11. S y racuse  ADS 23. Los Angeles ADS
12. New York ADS 24. San F ra n c isc o  AES
eSAGE D ire c tio n  C enterMap One. Adapted from SAGE Configuration Chart, Maxwell AFB H is to r ic a l Research Center Alabama, May 1982.
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the build-up of the Air National Guard and air defense 
forces in the 137-wing program between 1951-1956, the 
northern central-western states became a defensive wall of 
computerization, radars, aircraft, and missiles, with ten 
new installations and twelve new ANG locations.61 Grand 
Forks and Minot Air Force bases were part of this build-up. 
Both were integral links in the SAGE network across the 
northern U.S. ready to defend against a Soviet bomber 
attack. A combination of the Soviet threat, the urgent need 
for air defense, the strategic positioning of North Dakota, 
an increased reliance on air power, and the development of 
the SAGE computer led the Air Force to select sites in North 
Dakota for the air bases.
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and Sioux City AFB, Iowa. The twelve ANG locations included 
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Falls, Montana; Detroit, Michigan; Portland, Oregon.
CHAPTER 2
SITE SELECTION: PHASE ONE
In 1951 the Air Force received notification that its 
force structure would be expanded to 143 wings. North 
Dakota's strategic location and the growing Soviet bomber 
capability made it logical to locate a base within the 
state. The announcement of the increase touched off wide­
spread activity on the part of communities that were anxious 
to become the site of an air base. This chapter will examine 
the selection of Minot and Grand Forks and the subsequent 
controversy. While the North Dakotan people misjudged the 
Air Force's intentions, the Air Force would not explain its 
actions.
On the 2nd and 8th of February 1951 the Fargo Forum 
revealed that on 2 February Harold Vavra, Director of the 
North Dakota Aeronautics Commission had contacted Governor 
Norman Brunsdale about the possibility of utilizing any of 
the state's air fields for a base.1 The Forum articles 
created a frantic contest within the state as several 
communities lobbied to locate a base near their cities.
On 2 February, W. F. Sharp, Mayor of Jamestown, wrote 
Senator Milton R. Young concerning the possibility of using 
the Jamestown airport.2 Sharp was very interested in obtain­
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ing an air base. Young contacted the proper Air Force 
officials and replied that Jamestown might want to submit 
any other available information.3 In response, Sharp sent a 
complete packet of information on the airport to Young.
On 20 March, Brigadier General Robert E. Eaton, Director 
of Legislation Liaison, replied to Young, "There is no 
indication . . . that the facilities at jamestown will be 
required under the current expansion program."4 Besides 
Jamestown, several other communities, including Bismarck, 
Minot, Williston, and Wahpeton, contacted Air Force 
officials, while Fargo's mayor, Murray Baldwin, made a trip 
to Washington to confer with Air Force officials.5
In October of 1951 Wesley Keller of the Aeronautics 
Commission stated that, according to a "rumor," interceptor 
planes would be stationed at either Fargo or Bismarck. But 
Keller asserted the best site would be at Minot due to its 
proximity to the radar station and the resulting time-saving 
between take-off and interception.6
Meanwhile, Senator Young continued to check inuo the 
possibility of having an air base in the state. Following a 
Senate appropriations hearing, he discussed the issue with 
General Patrick W. Timberlake, Director of Installations.7 
Timberlake informed him that the Air Force was investigating 
the matter. But on 12 December 1951 General Eaton wrote 
Young that the Air Force did not have a military requirement 
for the North Dakota area under the current program. He
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added that Hector Field in Fargo had been considered under 
the 95-wing program but that other areas within the United 
States had received priority/
By November 1953, the Air Force had determined the force 
composition for the new 137-wing program. In keeping with 
the emphasis of the "New Look," the Air Force had decided to 
construct a line of air defense bases along the northern 
border. The development and placement of the SAGE had 
progressed far enough to begin the selection of possible 
sites in the required areas. After reviewing over six 
hundred-fifty locations, the Air Force wanted to proceed 
with construction at Clinton-Sherman, Oklahoma, Blytheville.
Arkansas, Seymour-Johnson, North Carolina, and Myrtle Beach, |
South Carolina, increase two existing bases at Columbus,
Mississippi and Moore, Texas, and to activate seven inter­
ceptor bases at the Bismarck-Minot and Fargo areas, North 
Dakota, Klamath Falls, Oregon, Glasgow-Miles City area,
Montana, Traverse City area and Marquette, Michigan, and the 
Southern California area.9
On 30 October 1953 North Dakota Congressman Otto Kreuger 
received a letter from Louise Fink of the House Office 
Building stating that the Air Force would be conducting a 
"routine survey" of the Fargo airport facilities.10 During 
the following days Air Defense Command officials met with 
city leaders in Fargo and Bismarck and collected informa­
tion on the municipal airports. Both sites were selected
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because they were in the area of requirement and had been 
used previously, during World War II.
Soon after the visit, Murray Baldwin, Mayor of Fargo, 
wrote General Lee Washbourne, Director of Installations, 
stating that, even though the visit was a preliminary study, 
he wanted the Air Force to know that Fargo "would be pleased 
to have the Air Force based here, and would offer them our 
full cooperation."11 Senator Young reiterated the sentiment 
of Baldwin, affirming that Hector Field "is a splendid 
field" and hoped that the Air Force would "give the most 
serious and sympathetic consideration" to Fargo.11 At the 
time Young's statements seemed innocent enough, but his 
positive appeal for Fargo would cause him trouble later. In 
response to Young, Brigadier General Joe W. Kelly, Director 
of Legislative Liaison, emphasized that the visits were only 
part of a procedure to maintain the current status of air­
ports in the country and "do not constitute any commitment 
that the airfield will be utilized by the Air Force."13 The 
Air Force would not announce any location in the 137-wing 
expansion program until President Eisenhower had presented 
his fiscal year 1955 budget in January 1954. Following the 
release of the budget and official notification of the 
expansion, the Air Force could select tentative sites for 
the new bases. Subsequently, on 9 February 1954 General 
Kelly notified both Kreuger and Young that the "Bismarck 
area" and "Fargo area" were under consideration for acti­
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vation "contingent upon satisfactory agreement with the 
local community."14 Both Congressmen relayed the exciting 
news to the Fargo and Bismarck officials. The next day 
newspapers in both cities rejoiced and reported that the Air 
Force had been there the previous year to examine the air­
ports. Fargo officials claimed erroneously that Young had
1 5been .instrumental in securing a site at that city. The 
Minot Daily News reported that Minot had been considered in 
November when the initial survey teams arrived; one of the 
survey officials had disclosed that an air base would be 
located at either Bismarck or Minot.16
On 18 February Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Munns of 
the Master Planning Division visited Fargo to re-examine 
the airport and discuss the base with city officials. The 
primary purpose of the visit was to obtain a resolution 
stating the city's willingness to have the base. He told 
Fargo that the monthly payroll would be about $225,000 and 
that the base could expand in the future over 200 percent 
above the seven hundred acres requested by the Air Force.17 
In addition, he showed a map which illustrated the proposed 
layout of the facilities at the airport for twenty-five 
interceptors. Munns asked the city to draw up a resolution 
concerning the four-point reguirement. These included: that 
the city provide the land by donation or lease; that the 
city accept Air Force personnel into the community; that 
zoning ordinances be drafted around the airport; and that
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right-of-ways for utilities be provided. Munns professed,
"We are not set on any particular site," but "We are looking 
for the best one." The Air Force required the resolution 
because "we don't like to put an air base near a city that 
doesn't want it."18
The following day Fargo's City Commission passed a 
resolution agreeing to all points except to donate the land 
which it could not financially accomplish. Nevertheless, 
Baldwin had been assured that the land would not be a 
"stumbling block" in obtaining the base.19 The only dissent­
ing voice came from Commissioner Gladys Zube, who asserted 
that "the people of Fargo might as well be forewarned that 
the jet base will be noisy" and there would be "problems of 
sanitation and police protection." However, she had no 
overall objections to the base and voted for the resolution.
While Colonel Munns inspected Fargo, E. G. Hansen, 
President of the Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce, sent a
letter to Munns after hearing that Fargo could not donate
21the land. Hansen stated, since Fargo was not "a foregone 
conclusion," he hoped that the Air Force would consider 
Grand Forks. He outlined the educational and geographic 
features of the area and proposed utilizing a virgin area of 
land approximately three miles northwest of the city along 
the Northern Pacific Railway. The land, he observed, could 
be procured "at a very nominal figure." On 20 March General 
Kelly replied that the Air Force had no requirement for the
42
Grand Forks area.
On the 22nd Colonel Munns visited Bismarck and informed 
the city that the 'area' designation meant a radius of "60 
miles." Munns requested that the city provide an additional 
two hundred-twenty acres around the airport on a long-term 
lease .23
As expected, the announcement, Munns' visit, and the
inability of Fargo to donate more land, produced a frenzy of
activity similar to that of 1951. Jamestown requested that
the Air Force make an on-site survey of its facilities and
offered the use of the airport facilities for one dollar per 
24year. Devil's Lake also strongly presented its case,
• • 2 5citing the advantages of its airport.
In response to the possibility of losing the base, Fargo 
stepped-up its flow of information to the Air Force. The 
Fargo Board of Education and tne Fargo Board of Realtors 
sent letters to Secretary of the Air Force Charles E.
Wilson, assuring him of adequate educational and housing 
facilities in Fargo. The Fargo Chamber of Commerce also sent 
a resolution to the Secretary, stating that the city could 
provide the "educational, recreational, cultural, and
2 fihousing needs of the personnel." On 7 April the Chamber 
of Commerce telegraphed Colonel Oran Price of the Air Force 
Real Estate Division, to inform him of Fargo's desire to 
assist in acquiring the needed land, contending, "We will do 




Senator Young soon found himself in the middle of an 
intense competition and a myriad of rumors. One of the more 
persistent rumors concerned the selection of Bismarck over 
Minot. Bryon Kluesing, a Minot constituent, questioned Young 
whether political influence had anything to ao with the 
decision; since, as Kluesing alleged, Minot had been one of 
the original choices.28 Young answered that Minot had not 
been considered, but the choice had been made to utilize 
previous World War II airports. In closing, Young expressed 
his "strict policy of neutrality, particularly when one or 
more cities in North Dctkota were interested in the same type 
of installation."29
To complicate matters for Young, several communities, 
including Mandan, Minot, and Grand Forks, requested consi­
deration as sites for the Air Force Academy, while Devil's 
Lake asked to be considered for any possible Army air-to- 
ground missile sites. Other cities besides Grand Forks, 
Minot, Jamestown, and Devil's Lake asked to be considered as 
a base site, including Valley City, Enderlin, Washburn, 
Underwood, and Wahpeton. Each community requested the aid 
of Young in securing a military installation for its town. 
While Young relayed information supplied by the communities 
to the Air Force and directed community delegations to the 
respective Air Force personnel, he continued to operate 
under a policy of neutrality.
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In testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services in April, the Air Force still contemplated the use 
of Pargo and Bismarck. General Washbourne explained that the 
Bismarck airport would be a joint-use facility with that 
city. In addition, the Air Force had received permission 
from the Army to utilize and rehabilitate eighty-one family
quarters at Fort Lincoln. In reference to the Fargo base,
he explained that the base was "very important" and "the 
intention of the Air Force [is] to locate the facility on an
• • • . . 31existing airport within the Fargo area." In further 
questioning, Air Force officials stated that the Air Force 
and Fargo had reached an agreement to use Hector Field for a 
nominal fee. Furthermore, the Fargo proposals were "perfect­
ly acceptable to the Air Force." Washbourne specified that 
the Air Force wanted a twenty-five year lease, not neces­
sarily a donation.32
Despite the tentative selection of Fargo and Bismarck, 
the Air Force continued to review the use of the two air­
ports. Following the testimony in early April, the Air Force 
decided against using the municipal airports in favor of 
sites outside the populated areas. The Air Force now had 
four sites which could meet area and operational require­
ments (Fargo, Bismarck, Minot, and Grand Forks) and, there­
fore, sent another survey team to North Dakota in May to 
examine those sites further.
On 11 May Colonel Fred G. Mauck, Installations Repre-
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sentative, arrived in Fargo and informed officials that the 
Air Force wanted to locate seven to fifteen miles outside 
the city for noise and safety reasons.33 Mauck "requested" 
that Fargo buy or lease between 2,500 and 4,500 acres of 
land to assure passage through Congress. City officials 
informed Mauck that they could not financially or legally do 
this. Nevertheless, city officials passed a resolution re­
affirming its desire to have an air base. It stated, in 
part, "the city of Fargo assures the Air Force that it will 
cooperate to the best of its ability to help meet and solve 
any and all problems."34 On the issue of the land, the 
resolution declared that Fargo would provide the land "under 
lease at nominal charge" at the airport but "the present 
resources of the City will not permit the purchasing of 
additional land by the City."
On the 12th Colonel Mauck visited Bismarck and informed 
officials that the Air Force had been "a little short­
sighted" in choosing sites close to populated areas. The 
chances of locating near Bismarck, however, were "still good 
but other sites in the defense area are being considered."35 
On the subject of land, Mauck said that some of the communi­
ties in the "air defense chain" have indicated that they 
would provide land. He asked "if it were possible" for 
Bismarck to provide some of the land. Mayor Evan Lips 
informed Mauck that the city could not provide the land.
On 12 May Hansen of Grand Forks sent a letter to
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Lieutenant Colonel John Milling, Real Estate Division, after 
it was announced that Hector Airport was no longer under 
consideration. Hansen included a map of the previously 
described "alkali" land northwest of the city in sections 
14, 15, 16, 21, 22, and 23 of Rye Township totaling 3,840 
acres. He stated that the land could be obtained at an 
estimated twenty-five dollars per acre.36
On 13 May Mauck left Bismarck and arrived in Minot.
The Minot Daily News reported that the Air Force wanted to 
locate north of the city to avoid coming into the Civil 
Aeronautic Administration (CAA) air waves where the military 
planes would be required to report to civil authorities.37 
Minot and Grand Forks had areas free from CAA waves, unlike 
Bismarck or Fargo. On the subject of the land, the paper 
quoted Mauck as saying that
If the land needed for the base could be provided cost- 
free for the government, it would make the problem of 
establishing the base easier, but this is not a pre­
requisite to a selection of a site and establishment of 
the base.
While he was in Minot, Mauck informed Grand Forks 
officials that he would like to examine sites in that area, 
and on the 14th the survey team arrived in Grand Forks. The 
team surveyed the area for three hours, looking primarily at 
the alkali area northwest of the city in the Manvel area.38 
While Mauck was examining the Grand Forks site, the Minot 
Chamber of Commerce passed a twenty-seven-page resolution in 
which it agreed to raise fifty thousand dollars to be used
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toward the purchase of land.39
Mauck's four-day expedition across the state provided 
new hope to by-passed communities and created paranoia in 
Bismarck. On 17 May the Grand Forks Chamber of Commerce 
passed a resolution, stating in part that Grand Forks would 
"to the fullest extent possible within its means and author­
ity, actively cooperate with the Air Force both in the es­
tablishment and construction of such base."40Threatened by 
Minot's monetary offer, Bismarck on the 20th agreed to
raise $150,000 by general subscription "if that is what the
. 41Air Force demands" and submitted a thirty-page resolution.
On the 19th Valley City sent a letter to Mauck, declaring
its willingness to have the base in Valley City and to
provide a maximum of $62,500 for the purchase of needed 
4 2land. Bismarck, Jamestown, Washburn, Fargo, Valley City, 
Devil's Lake, Minot, and Grand Forks all sent delegations to 
Washington to present their cases.43
On 29 May Bismarck sent a delegation to Washington to 
lobby for that city. The group included President of the 
Chamber of Commerce Ed Lahr, Bismarck Tribune editor John 
Hjelle, Mayor Lips, and former mayor Tom Kleppe. Upon their 
return, the members stated in the official report that "it 
was evident that the possibility of locating the Jet Air 
Base in Bismarck was somewhat remote. It was the feeling 
that all bases would be located further north than the
• • 44original proposed locations." But the Bismarck Tribune
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reported in direct opposition to the pessimistic official 
report that no definite news could be derived from the trip 
to Washington. According to the Tribune. Lips said "he 
[Lips] was confident all contacts had been made in 
Washington that could help get the Bismarck story across to 
the 'right people.1" 45
By the first of June the Air Force was in the review
stages for the final selection. During Congressional
hearings the Air Force submitted a revised list of bases
which included the "Bismarck-Minot area" change. In
testimony before the Armed Services Committee, the Air Force
came under more questioning concerning the sites. General J.
F. Rodenhauser, Director of Real Property, exolained to the
committee the change in the Bismarck location:
The municipal airport at Bismarck gave us considerable 
concern after our survey team had been out there and 
came back with photos and layouts. You could stand in 
the middle of the primary runway at Bismarck and look 
down it and see the church steeple or a school building 
right off the end.45
He emphasized the hazards at that ^ime, but more important, 
in uhe future, as the city and base expanded the hazards 
would increase. General Rodenhauser explained that surveys 
had been conducted around Bismarck, but "there is a stream 
that winds down through there with a very abrupt escarpment. 
There are hills in the immediate vicinity, and hence we had 
to widen our search" to Minot and Grand Forks. In addition, 
he stated that there were no expandable sites close to 
Bismarck. In comparing the costs of utilizing the Bismarck
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airport against a new site, he pointed out that the cost 
would be equal since new facilities would have to be built 
at the airport. When asked what the Air Force would do if 
the committee would not permit the language to read 
'Bismarck-Minot area,' Rodenhauser responded that the Air 
Force would want the 'airport' left out of 'Bismarck Air­
port' to maintain some flexibility.47
With the pressure to provide land and knowing that a
decision was in its final stages, Grand Forks' Mayor Hansen
in a last minute act of desperation on 10 July, telegraphed
the Air Force stating that "Land on any of the sites
inspected to be provided without cost to Government" and the
community was ready "to construct up to 300 housing units
starting immediately upon receiving word that Grand Forks
4 8location had been approved for base."
The issue of land donations had concerned Senator Young, 
and he had inquired concerning the practice of soliciting 
donations to determine if North Dakota was being treated 
fairly,, On 11 June General Kelly provided a list of sixteen 
bases whose communities had donated land during the previous 
five years.49 Kelly wrote that "the Air Force has an obliga­
tion to the taxpayers of the nation to develop its base 
structure with a minimum expenditure of Federal funds." 
Furthermore, he stated "important considerations in the 
selection of base sites are area of requirement, operational 
capability, community support and economy of development.
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If all other factors are equal then economy of development 
becomes the deciding factor." Such contributions of land, 
Kelly went on to say, "would vary with the financial 
capability of each community." Young forwarded copies of the 
letter to officials in North Dakota, including Hjelle, 
hoping to quell the controversy.
On 17 June 1954 the Air Force announced that two sites2*
had been cnosen which included the Fargo-Grand Forks site at 
Grand Forks and the Bismarck-Minot site at Minot. Both bases 
would be located ten to fifteen miles northwest of the 
cities. The announcement stated "the governing factors in
selecting the site locations were operational suitability,
, *0community support, and economical development of the site."”
The announcement set off a barrage of hostile reactions
that had been building up for weeks. Hjelle, speaking
through the Bismarck Tribune, wrote that Fargo and Bismarck
were "left hanging high and dry by the Air Force's final
determination."51 Guy Larson, a member of the North Dakota
State Legislature and resident of Bismarck', contended
angrily, "I don't feel too bad about Minot getting the air
base but I am pretty damn mad about the way the deal was
. 52handled by the Air Force." Furthermore, he said,
Bismarck got a lousy deal on this whole airport thing.
. . . By God, when our men were presenting their case 
before them, a certain Col. Mauk [sic] sat winking at a 
couple of his boys like a nobleman who was amused by 
simple peasants. . . . Believe me, I have never seen so
many people burned up about anything.
Larson was not a member of the Bismarck Washington delega­
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tion nor present at it return meeting.
As expected, the Minot Daily News reported the selection 
with much bravado and excitement. Hailing the efforts of the 
Washington delegation and the twenty-seven page brochure, 
the paper concluded that the strong actions taken by the 
community swayed the decision.03 As in Minot, the Grand 
Forks Herald published the news in equally self-congratu­
latory egotism. The paper praised such efforts as bringing 
the Air Force delegation to the city in "private cars," 
supplying plat-books and real estate prices, the efforts of 
the city officials and Senator William Langer, and Hanson’s 
visit to Washington. A Herald editorial gave "full credit 
for his [Langer's] part in the successful completion of 
negotiations initiated by the professional and businessmen 
of the city."5j In fact, there is no evidence to suggest 
Langer contributed in any way other than forwarding informa­
tion, which the other Congressmen did also. While all three 
Congressmen assisted each community, Young's office became 
the focal point for each community. More than likely, the 
Herald wanted to get back at Young for allegedly assisting 
Fargo. Young had also informed Grand Forks Herald publisher, 
M. M. Oppegard, that the Air Force was set on Fargo, and it 
would be useless for Grand Forks to try to get the base.55
Young isolated himself further from Grand Forks by 
questioning the selection of that location when the 
announcement came out. Young had inquired why the sites had
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been chosen, because he had informed. Devil's Lake they were 
too far away from the area of consideration. It was his 
understanding that Devil's Lake was farther from the radar 
stations than the regulations in the authorizations would 
permit. Since Grand Forks and Devil's Lake were approximate­
ly the same distance from the Finley radar station in North 
Dakota, Young wanted to know why Devil's Lake had not been 
considered.57
Joe Bridston, prominent businessman and former state
Senator from Grand Forks said that Grand Forks was "quite
shocked" at Young's reaction immediately after the announce- 
58ment. While Hal Davies, publisher of the Minot Daily News, 
stabbed angrily, "Minot is surprised and disappointed by 
confusion you [Young] have injected into air fields. It 
certainly cannot be interpreted as a friendly action."59 
Oppegara asked Young if he were "writing Grand Forks off 
[his] political map so we can say so if that is the case."60
Young requested information from the Committee on Armed 
Services with regards to the ‘area' designation in Fargo. In 
a reply, the Air Force felt the language of the bill permit­
ted the Grand Forks designation. It explained that the exact 
location would be within a "circle," the center of which was 
classified information.61 Furthermore, "The Air Force wit­
nesses maintain that for tactical reasons it is desirable to 
locate the base as close as possible to the center of this 
circle and that Grand Forks is closer than is Fargo."
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On 22 June Colonel William C. Warren, Assistant
Director of Budget, answered Young's questions in more6 2detail concerning Devil's Lake. He stated that the Air 
Force's original intentions were "the use of the Fargo and 
Bismarck Municipal Airports in order to take advantage of 
the existing available facilities, although it was recogniz­
ed at the time that these were marginally acceptable sites." 
But after further review, the Air Force decided not to use 
them and considered virgin sites. The Air Force re-evaluated 
potential sites, in which Grand Forks and Minot
most nearly meet the criteria prescribed for the bases, 
not only with respect to favorable terrain, expans­
ibility and adequate community support, but also because 
of their geographical location in relationship to radar 
coverage and anticipated point of contact.63
Colonel Warren elaborated further on the radar coverage,
Each of our Air Defense Command bases is positioned to 
fit into the pattern of our radar coverage and these 
base locations are so interwoven onto our over-all 
defense program that any major deviation in the location 
of one would appreciably affect the operations of other 
fighter bases in the same general areas of the United 
States and could possibly necessitate the relocation of 
those bases. By proper positioning of these bases we can 
obtain the maximum protection possible with available 
forces. An important factor on the selection of these 
base locations was their proper positioning in relation 
to existing and programmed Air Defense Command bases.54
He went on to describe some of the factors in selecting a
site,
in addition to favorable terrain and offers of commu­
nity cooperation. The site must be suitably positioned 
within the area of requirement, the terrain must not 
only be favorable for economical base development but it 
must allow for future expansibility of the base; the 
site should be proximate to rail, highway and communi­
cations systems; and the community must have the
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necessary off-base housing, transportation, utilities, 
schools, churches, services, recreational facilities and 
other amenities.65’
In relation to the efforts of Fargo and Bismarck, Warren 
emphasized that "no positive actions should be taken or 
expenditures made in anticipation of the proposed base." 
Instead, the Air Force required initial resolutions from 
the cities because it was necessary that the Air Force 
obtain a favorable expression before the selection. Warren 
concluded,
The selection of the Minot and Grand Forks sites, as for 
all Air Force base sites, was made after careful study 
and evaluation by competent engineers, technicians, and 
staff officers who recommended these sites as having the 
greatest capability, both from an operational standpoint 
and from the standpoint of e c o n o m y .66
Hjelle did not limit his condemnation of the Air Force 
to the Tribune following the announcement; he sent letters 
to Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott and Senator 
Young, as well as eight other government officials. He 
condemned the procedures of the Air Force which disregarded 
the interest and feelings of the community and described the 
"kiss-off" during his Washington visit. He complained that 
Colonel Mauck would not provide the delegation with any 
other Air Force officials to contact, or clarify if addi­
tional opportunities existed. He suggested Mauck be "subject 
to severe censure" and hoped "that Senator Young of our 
state will seek to accomplish this in the proper way."67
Hjelle continued to attack the Air Force; in an 18 June 
editorial Hjelle called for an investigation of the
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"ineptitude of the Air Force in creating the situation it 
has created here. Perhaps officers who are responsible for 
it should be relieved of authority before they can create 
mere confusion like this."60 He went on to point out that 
Bismarck must be suitable from an operational and economi­
cal standpoint to have been initially chosen and community 
support had been assured. On 19 June Hjelle condemned the 
Air Force for quibbling over a few dollars to purchase the 
land, compared with the millions the bases would eventually 
cost. He then called a second time for Young to ask some 
pertinent questions concerning the matter at the next Senate 
Appropriations Committee hearing.69
Young thought that he had remained neutral and fair in 
questioning the site selection. But with the most vocal of 
the North Dakota citizens angry at the Air Force and him, 
Young was becoming irate himself. On 21 June he wrote 
Colonel Price, "I have never known a time when the North 
Dakota people were as badly disturbed as they are at the 
present time. The Air Force certainly did the world's worst 
job of public relations."70
But the matter would not go away, and Young still faced 
a doubting, critical constituency. On 9 July Young question­
ed Senator Francis Case, South Dakota, Chairman of the 
Committee on Armed Services, in the Senate.71 Yeung inquired 
what military reason necessitated the change in sites. Case 
replied that the committee had examined,
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the location of radar stations, which, in part, dictate 
the location of these bases. We were guided by the fact 
that this particular line of bases follows the border 
across the northern part of the United States. The Air 
Force suggested the locations at Minot, rather than at 
Bismarck, and Grand Forks, rather than at Fargo, as 
being more strategic.72
On the question of whether land contributions influenced the
decision, Case replied that it did not, but
certain other considerations were involved. The stra­
tegic situation in relation to the radar centers was the 
most important. A second consideration— and offsetting 
to the one the Senator from North Dakota has mentioned—  
was the ground available and the location with reference 
to the cities and the effect of using jet planes in 
proximity to cities.73
Young could not bear the heat of an angry constituency 
or back down from Hjelle's (one of his former employees) 
demands for revenge and answers. He decided to confront the 
Air Force, specifically Mauck, during the Supplemental 
Appropriations hearings on 8 August to finally get some 
clear answers and satisfy Hjelle's thirst for revenge.
He began his inquisition by questioning what satisfac­
tory agreements were required by the Air Force and if a 
donation of land was required as part of the satisfactory 
agreement.74 General Washbourne replied that the agreement,
does not refer to what the city offered, or failed to 
offer, in discussions with Air Force representatives.
It was intended to and still is intended to develop the 
attitude of the community toward accepting an Air Force 
activity. . . . many communities in this country want
nothing less than an Air Force activity introduced into 
their community. On the other hand, many of the 
communities around the country are agreeable to Air 
Force participation.75
Young centered his attention next on Colonel Mauck's trip to
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the state. He asked Mauck if he had told the city that the 
land would have to be furnished. Mauck denied the allegation 
replying,
No, sir. I think I told them that if it was possible for 
the city to donate the land that it would be better, it 
would be simpler for us to present our project to the 
Congress but there was no limitation in any way, sir, 
that if the city felt they could donate the land, it was 
acceptable to the Air Force.76
In a series of questions, Young than interrogated the
Air Force personnel involved in the site selection.
Senator Young: Now if neither one of these cities would 
have offered to furnish land, what would you have done 
with that airbase?
Colonel Mauck: We would have had to locate the base 
under the same conditions that we did originally. That 
is to say on the basis of the operational requirements.
Senator Young: There is about 100,000 [dollars] worth of 
land involved in this $7 million base.
General Washbourne: I believe it would have gone on the 
exactly same tract of land that it did go on.
Senator Young: Exactly where it did go, whether or not 
the city furnished the land?
General Washbourne: That is not a material factor in the 
selection of these operational bases.
Senator Young: Now we are. making some headway and 
getting things straightened out. What was your reason 
for first locating the airbase at Bismarck?
General Washbourne: . . .  we were confronted with the 
problem of fairly quickly identifying where those 
[fighter interceptor] squadrons should go. Naturally the 
first thing that occurred to us was to find the existing 
municipal airports in the operational area and see if 
they would fill the bill. That was the base of the 
original survey.
Senator Young: Did you tell the cities they needed to 
furnish land?
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General Washbourne: No, sir; we did not. The fact that 
the cities owned these air ports and would be expected 
to lease them to us i f we made an agreement was 
important. We later changed our mind based on 
operational problems and additional surveys. The site 
reported in Bismarck after we got all of the engineering 
on it had certain operational obstacles that we felt 
would be inadvisable to accept as a long-range 
development. They offered to help us locate a half-dozen 
sites within reach of Bismarck.
Senator Young: Did they offer to donate the land?
General Washbourne: Yes, sir.
Senator Young: You moved the site to Minot for military 
reasons?
General Washbourne: Exactly.
Senator Young: That is what I want on the record. And 
the land had little part in that?
General Washbourne: Very little. It merely needed the 
attitude of the community had they wanted the Air Force 
there or objected to our presence.77
After establishing that the land issue was not a
material factor in the final selection, Young turned his
attention toward Bismarck's useless efforts. As if Hjelle
were speaking through Young, the Senator drilled Washbourne:
The city of Bismarck went to considerable effort to 
prepare for this base, and it was considerable, do you 
not think it would have been a good public relations act 
for the Air Force to go back to Bismarck and explain to 
him [sic] why you moved the Sxce to Minot?78
Washbourne could do nothing but agree and concurred that "we
could have done a better job in explaining the factors that
led to these selections to the local people."79
In an effort to allay the accusations in North Dakota,
Young now addressed the issue that political influence
entered the selection of the sites. He questioned Washbourne
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as to whether any official from Young's office or Young 
himself had tried to influence the decision. Washbourne 
replied that no one had.80
By now, Young began to show his indignation. Speaking
to Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas, he remarked,
"Your Colonel Mauck here and Colonel Price succeeded in
making about the worst possible mess in North Dakota."81
After reading two Bismarck Tribune editorials and Guy
Larson's letter, Young lashed into Mauck again, this time
concerning the Bismarck delegation's trip to Washington. In
reference to Larson's letter, Mauck replied, "the letters
that have arrived from Bismarck, North Dakota, are untrue.
I do not believe that they represent the true fact at all, 1
sir."82 In meeting witn the Bismarck group Mauck asserted,
I informed them that the Air Force had not made a 
decision at that time, that we would give every 
consideration to the Bismarck area and we were not in a 
position at that time to give them a final decision and 
that at no time did I make any arrogant statement or 
other statement that have been mentioned in that letter.
I treated them with the utmost of respect, sir.83
In Mauck's defense, Washbourne mentioned that the local
people probably felt Mauck made the final decision. Instead,
his report went through a whole series of decision making
levels. At this point, Secretary Douglas inserted that the
mention of any land donations could easily be misinterpreted
by the communities to mean something it was not.84
The answers satisfied Young but, nevertheless, he
criticized the manner in which the Air Force handled the
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situation. He sent transcripts of the hearings to all the 
major cities in North Dakota. His inquisition answered 
several important questions. He ascertained the truth with­
out relying on second-hand sources and quieted the dis­
content within the state on all sides of the issue. But 
more importantly to him personally, he preserved his appear­
ance of being non-committal during the selection process.
No one in North Dakota was as pleased as Hjelle after 
receiving word of Young's interrogation. He wrote Young,
"The grilling you gave those big-wigs from the Pentagon 
made me feel good. I'll bet there was some real squirming 
and sweating."85 Playing to Hjelle's paranoia, Young replied 
that the Air Force was a "pretty cocky and inconsiderate 
outfit" and "Colonel Mauck was in plenty of trouble."86
But even though Hjelle had his revenge, he remained 
angry at the Air Force. In a subsequent editorial he dis­
cussed the cancellation of an eight million dollar Air Force 
aviation school in San Antonio, Texas. Citing a "patho­
logical weakness" in the Air Force for its inherent indeci­
sion, Hjelle described the Air Force as "lords of the 
Pentagon" and "finger-snappers for security." He ascribed 
the inability to make a firm decision to "symptoms of a
• ft 7psychopathic weakness."
The question still remained, were the North Dakota 
citizens at fault or was Air Force for the embroilment? 
Clearly, the citizens failed to comprehend fully the
61
situation and interpreted events in such a way as to confuse 
matters even more. But the Air Force also made a mistake by 
not throughly informing the communities ot important 
military information which would have eased the tension.
The first was that the Air Force faced a very short time 
period between announcing the locations and the date of 
occupancy. Both bases were on the ''critical” list and the 
Air Force planned to have the Fargo base ready by February 
1957 and the Bismarck base by March 1956.88 Unfortunately, 
in its haste the Air Force choose two existing, "marginal” 
sites which in November 1953 appeared to meet their 
requirements. It was a standard policy to utilize former 
World War II airports or other existing sites in the area of 
requirement. By 1956 the Air Force was using twenty-two 
municipal fields jointly with the adjacent community, with 
thirteen of these in the fighter-interceptor role.89 The Air 
Force erred in announcing the tentative locations in 
February without fully considering the Bismarck and Fargo 
sites. If they had given the airports more consideration, 
then they could have examined Minot and Grand Forks without- 
creating problems.
But when the Air Force did announce the two tentative 
sites, Fargo and Bismarck made the mistake of assuming the 
sites were limited to the municipal airports. In the 
language of the bill, only the Bismarck Airport had been 
mentioned specifically, while the Fargo base had always been
62
an area* designation. Peihaps, if the cities had known that 
Mauck's visit was only a survey of possible sites, they 
would not have taken the visit as seriously. But even here 
the blame rests with the Air Force for its premature 
announcement, since it would have been inconceivable to 
suggest that the cities treat Mauck's visit lightly after it 
was known two air bases would be located in the state.
The problem with the survey teams did not originate in 
North Dakota. In January 1952 Secretary of the Air Force 
Thomas A. Finletter explained to Congressional leaders that 
the "presence of a survey team does not announce the 
locality in advance," but communities tended to believe that 
a survey team "proves that the Air Force has decided
• 90something." Finletter said that the surveys caused 
problems in the local communities by producing "articles in 
newspapers" which were often untrue. Even though the teams 
provided valuable information on housing and community 
attitude, they became a problem when the local community 
blew the survey out of proportion, which is what had 
occurred in North Dakota.
The preliminary survey team in November, Munns1 visit in 
February, and Mauck's expedition in May were all part of a 
procedure pre-planned by the Air Force. Between 1951 and 
1953, the Air Force presented in Congressional testimony a 
detailed outline of the procedures used to locate base sites
• • 91m  the United States. Following a determination of the new
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force structure, survey teams were sent to possible sites to 
examine weather, terrain, expansion of runways, future 
costs, communication and land costs, housing availability, 
community attitudes toward the base and future Air Force 
personnel, and long-term usability. The next step involved a 
review of the survey findings and a reduction of the sites 
to a minimum. The final selection would be made based on 
cost comparisons, satisfactory negotiations with the cities, 
and military considerations.
In light of this procedure, the events in North Dakota 
become clearer. The November survey teams represented the 
initial portion of the procedure. Munns' visit was required 
to obtain an agreement with the communities before the final 
selection could be made. But Mauck's visit was a combination 
of the initial survey team and Munns' visit and represented 
a step backward in the process. North Dakota citizens 
erroneously understood Mauck's visit to be an effort by the 
Air Force to confuse the selection and precipitate a state 
feud. In the eyes of the Air Force, Mauck's visit was 
required to simplify the selection process.
One very important question was what did the Air Force 
plan to do with the bases? In 1953 the Air Force had already 
received approval to implement SAGE and had tentatively 
approved blueprints of the system. The area of radar and 
interceptor coverage mandated that the air bases be 
approximately two hundred miles apart horizontally across
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the northern U.S. in order to provide effective inter­
ception within each SAGE sector. This configuration only 
permitted Grand Forks, Minot, Fargo, and Bismarck to be 
considered. While the other communities, such as Devils 
Lake, were too far away or too close to other sites.
Throughout the inquiry into the reasons for the changes, 
the locations of the site to the surrounding radar stations 
played a particular role. Since the Air Force already had a 
tentative SAGE blueprint in mind, it would have contemplated 
which locations would be used for radar posts. The "central 
point" came up most often in Congressional testimony in 
reference to Grand Forks. The Pinetree radar posts at 
Beausejour and Gypsumville, Manitoba, and the radar sites at 
Chandler and Wadena, Minnesota, Finley, North Dakota, and 
Gettysburg, South Dakota, tied into the Grand Forks sector. 
By taking the radius of the radar net, Grand Forks, not 
Fargo, was the most central location, which Senator Case 
alluded to in his discussion with Young.
Although not discussed in Congressional testimony, the
location of Minot was also a more central location to the
radars in the Minot Air Defense Sector. The sector radar
locations included Fortuna, Minot, and Dickinson, North
Dakota, Ophiem and Miles City, Montana, Sundance, Wyoming,
Ellsworth, South Dakota, and Yorkton and Saskatoon Mountain, 
92Saskatchewan.
Later after the sites had been selected, Senator Young
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wrote a constituent concerning the selection of the sites.
He said that the sites "were selected by the Air Force 
without consulting a single member of Congress or anyone
, % 93within the state." Furthermore, he stated in the letter 
that the radar sites had
to be located certain distances and certain directions 
from the jet air bases as they will be the main 
installations of an ultra new control system [SAGE] 
which will not only locate the enemy planes but will 
guide our own planes and guided missiles to the 
approaching enemy target.
While the SAGE system dictated the horizontal distance, 
several other factors determined the vertical location.
Since these were interceptor bases, the time lapse factor 
and "anticipated point of contact" became paramount. Minot 
was approximately one hundred-twenty miles north of 
Bismarck, while Grand Forks was eighty miles north of Fargo. 
The distance and time lost to reach the point of intercep­
tion would have been substantial at the more southern 
locations.
At the time of the announcement, the Air Force planned 
to station F-89D 'Dog' aircraft at the bases. These planes 
had a maximum speed of 600 miles per hour and a 1,000 mile 
range.94 If the Air Force had decided to locate the bases in 
Fargo and Bismarck, the combat effectiveness of the inter­
ceptors would have been curtailed drastically. Taking off 
from either Fargo or Bismarck, the interceptors would have 
to travel an extra eighty-to-one-hundred-twenty miles, using 
eight to twelve minutes of precious time. In addition, at
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the Fargo-Bismarck locations the combat range would decrease 
appreciably, since the aircraft would spend one hundred- 
sixty to two hundred-forty miles leaving and returning to 
the locations.
The Air Force also wanted the aircraft to reach the 
limits of the radar range which were tied into each SAGE 
center. In the case of Grand Forks and Minot SAGE sectors, 
the most northern radar was approximately two hundred-fifty 
miles north, while the range of the radar extended the 
distance another one hundred-fifty to two hundred miles 
north. The aircraft would be launched prior to detection at 
the Pinetree radar line, since the Mid-Canada line would 
provide detection and distance of the incoming aircraft. At 
Grand Forks and Minot the interceptors could reach the 
limits of radar coverage and still have fuel to engage the 
enemy and return to the base. At Fargo and Bismarck, the 
effectiveness of the aircraft dropped drastically and 
permitted the enemy to advance closer to the targets before 
interception could take place.
Besides the interceptors, the Air Force planned on 
locating the BOMARC ground-to-air anti-aircraft missile at 
Grand Forks and Minot. The BOMARC was an air defense 
missile first launched in February 1955. In a 1955 plan 
Grand Forks and Minot, North Dakota, Duluth, Minnesota, and 
Opheim Air Force Station, Montana, would have BOMARC units, 
with both North Dakota locations operational by 1962 .95 In
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1958 the Air Force revised the plan but still included Grand 
Forks and Minot. By 1960 the North Dakota sites were dropped 
but Duluth remained. Since the BOMARC missile had a range of 
only 440 miles, the location of the site in relationship 
to the point of contact became very important. If the Air 
Force had chosen Bismarck and Fargo, the effective range 
would have been cut by 25 percent. By locating at Grand 
Forks and Minot, the missile could reach the limits of the 
air defense sectors and radar range.
In addition, there is evidence to suggest that in 1954 
the Air Force had already contemplated using the proposed 
bases for more than interceptors. It is highly unlikely that 
military planners would have missed the point that just as 
the Soviets could fly nuclear bombers more quickly [and 
shorter down] from the north, the U.S. could reach locations 
in the Soviet Union just as easily by using the polar route. 
Approximately one year after the selection of the North 
Dakota sites, the Air Force began preparing officially for 
the "dispersal" of SAC aircraft.95
At Grand Forks and Minot the Air Force constructed the 
runways for multi-purpose use rather than solely for 
interceptors and made provisions for lengthening and 
widening the runways. Runways for interceptors had a 25,000 
pound weight limit but the runways at both North Dakota 
bases were built with 100,000 pound limits.97 In May 1956, 
as the Air Force planned to introduce the B-52 to North
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Dakota, Secretary Douglas pointed out "we had this 
advantage. We built the runways with heavy duty pavement for 
B-52 operation."98 The large acreage the Air Force requested 
also suggests a mission larger than solely an interception. 
The 200 percent expansion Munns' suggested in February to 
Fargo and Bismarck became a reality within just a few years.
The land donation issue created the most turmoil. Nearly 
every city offered some form of economic assistance to the 
Air Force. If the land were the over-riding issue, then 
Bismarck would have surely received the base, since it 
offered twice as much acreage as Minot. The practice of 
receiving land donations had been long established Air Force 
policy. More importantly, the Air Force had already request­
ed $257,000 for land at Fargo and $179,000 at Bismarck." The 
Air Force explained that requests for a donation or lease 
were to ease the process through Congress. But even with 
land donations and leases, the Air Force purchased enormous 
amounts of land. In 1953, for example, the Air Force acquir­
ed 64,052 acres of land at a cost of $15,669,600J 00 It was 
because of such high costs that the Air Force sought dona­
tions or leases where possible. Furthermore, the Air Force 
required ownership by lease or possession in order to 
construct the facilities.
The cities interpreted the land issue in the wrong way. 
In North Dakota the traditional east-west rivalry broke out 
into a north-south rivalry too. Each city compared its
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actions to what happened elsewhere in the state and tried to 
out-maneuver the competition. The newspaper articles preci­
pitated the paranoia and misunderstanding by incorrectly 
reporting the news. One example involved Colonel Maude's 
visit. The Fargo Forum reported that Mauck "requested the 
city [Fargo] buy or lease" the land, which would "assure the 
forwarding of the project."'0' The Bismarck Tribune reported 
Mauck as saying "if it were possible" for Bismarck to lease 
or donate the land.102 The Minot Daily News declared that 
Mauck assorted that the "land [is] not a prerequisite.1,103 
But after three days the Grand Forks Herald chose to report 
Mauck as saying to officials there the "land would have to 
be provided," which Mauck later denied.104 Following the 
trip to Grand Forks, the Bismarck Tribune reported that the 
Air Force "demanded" the land.105 It is apparent that the 
newspapers helped the confusion over the site issue by 
selectively reporting the news and wording the details to 
suit their own needs. Undoubtedly, Mauck1s visit was con­
ducted in an uniform manner established by- the Air Force. 
Mauck informed the cities that the land was not a require­
ment, but because of each city's publicity and eagerness to 
offer the most, the issue became clouded and distorted.
Hjelle deserves a fair amount of criticism in the 
matter. He not only misrepresented the results of the 
Bismarck delegation's Washington trip, but also elected to 
vent his personal vendetta through the press. It is unclear
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exactly what happened in the Washington trip of which Hjelle 
and Larson spoke. But it is clear that nothing remotely 
associated with the "kiss-off," as Hjelle described, appear­
ed in the official delegation report nor in the Tribune the 
following day. If Hjelle, and the other newspapers, had 
published the news correctly, without trying to maintain 
morale in their communities by covering-up the facts, (as 
Hjelle had done after the Washington trip), the final 
decision would not have been such a shock to the people.
Hjelle's three-point assertion in the 18 June editorial 
was correct, but he failed to understand that other factors 
governed the decision. It was true not only of Bismarck but 
also of all four communities that they were suitable from an 
operational standpoint, community support was more than 
adequate, and they could be developed economically. But the 
more advantageous military-strategic position of Minot and 
Grand Forks ruled out Bismarck and Fargo after suitable 
sites had been found in those locations.
When the Air Force decided to locate seven to fifteen 
miles outside the cities, they had every reason to do so.
The Air Force embarked on a new policy during this period to 
provide "bases with approach and take-off corridors seven 
miles long and four miles wide," because nearly "sixty per­
cent of all take-off and landing accidents occurred within 
these corridors.1,106 The Air Force had to face the fact that 
these bases would have nuclear weapons stored on them and
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be carried by aircraft in the future. The Air Force also 
made an effort to separate the slower civilian aircraft from 
the fast jet aircraft of the Air Force to avoid accidents.
The policy reflected a change from relying on existing 
substandard facilities to completely new and larger 
installations.
General Rodenhauser stated in Congressional testimony 
that the disadvantages of Hector Airport were its close 
proximity to Fargo, limited operational capabilities, 
obstructions in the flight path, and takeoffs over the city.507 
He added that "Fargo could never be a satisfactory Air Force 
base for jet aircraft." In the case of Bismarck he stated 
the disadvantages as "limited base expansion" in addition to 
the same reasons cited for Fargo.
Geographic reasons also had an impact on the decision.
When the Air Force examined sites around Bismarck, they 
found unacceptable terrain to the north and east of the 
city. But in the south the Missouri River flowed through the 
area and the county line was next to the city in the west. 
Faced with an area which fell below standards, the Air Force 
looked to Minot for a suitable location.
Another aspect of the equation which surely had an 
impact on the outcome involved the 178th FIS Air National 
Guard unit at Hector Field. As previously mentioned, the 
178th had already become part of the air defense structure.
In 1953-54 the Air Force expanded the runways, aprons,
7 2
taxi-ways, and constructed a new hanger for the ANG unit 
totaling over $1.8 million.108 By 1961 the total real 
property investment would be ever five million dollars. 
Clearly, the Air Force did not want to integrate a regular 
Air Force unit and a rapidly expanding ANG unit in one small 
area. Furthermore, the Air Force persistently made an issue 
of "defense-in-depth." By locating the regular interceptor 
units at Grand Forks and Minot, the Air Force integrated the 
ANG unit in Fargo into the SAGE radar and interception 
scheme and obtained a defense-in-depth— a pattern which 
would be repeated across the northern United States.109
One final question remains, did Senator Young remain 
neutral in the site selection process? Clearly, he used his 
influence in 1951 by discussing the possibility of obtaining 
an air base in the state with Air Force officials. But 
military requirements determined the need for two air bases 
in North Dakota and not political influence. Young did step 
out of his neutrality when the Air Force decided initially 
on Fargo, but not to the extent that Fargo and the other 
communities would later claim. But very soon afterwards, 
Young adopted his policy of neutrality as each city asked 
for his assistance. Young's problems were complicated by 
a sensitive constituency that interpreted his every move in 
a positive or negative manner, rather than neutral, as he 
actually was.
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CHAPTER 3
SITE SELECTION*: PHASE TWO
Despite the selection of sites near Grand Forks and 
Minot the Air Force still had to pin-point the location of 
each base. At Minot the process would be relatively trouble 
free. At Grand Forks however the original site would be 
turned down, and, in the ensuing confusion, another 
controversy would erupt over selection of the final site.
In Grand Forks County the Air Force initially had chosen 
the "alkali flats" area in Rye Township as a site for the 
base. When the Army Corps of Engineers and Air Force 
examined the area more closely, they found the site inade­
quate for base construction. Therefore, the Air Force 
evaluated other sites within the cou ty which might meet 
their criteria— ten to fifteen miles from the city, good 
road and railway access, and favorable soil conditions. On 
7 December the Air Force announced that two other sites were 
now under consideration— one seventeen miles north of Grand 
Forks in Levant Township and the other thirteen miles west 
in Mekinock Township.1
Almost immediately the citizens in the Mekinock area 
banded together with attorney Richard King of Grand Forks to 
fight the site selection. On 9 December King on behalf of
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that residents in the Mekinock area filed a petition which 
questioned the common sense of locating the base on good 
farming land, as opposed to poor quality land occupied by 
few residents.2
On 28 December King notified Senator Young that he 
represented several of the land owners who objected to the 
new site.3 He stated, "My clients own and farm some of the 
best agricultural land in the Red River Valley. Their farms 
are generally well cultivated and highly developed and each 
year yield a very substantial farm product." He continued 
"the United States Air Force, after making a reconnaissance 
survey of the Grand Forks vicinity has completely dis­
regarded locating on the low value land." Furthermore, "It 
appears gross economic waste to pour concrete over the best 
farm land in the Red River Valley." He concluded that the 
area had produced $162,400 in farm products in 1953 and 
would produce over two million dollars in the following ten 
years. In addition, two large turkey farms, the Myra 
Foundation, directly south along Highway 2, and the 
Schroeder Farm to the north, would be put out. of business.
King and Carroll Day, Chairman of the Grand Forks 
Site Selection Committee, had already flown to the head­
quarters of the Missouri River Division of the Corps of 
Engineers at Omaha, Nebraska, to discuss the new site with 
Colonel Winston Fowler of the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Fowler could give no assurances but informed King that the
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Corps recommendations had not been sent to the Air Force.
The recommendations would be forthcoming and would consider 
the residents' desires.1’
On 4 January 1955 King wrote Young again after having 
met with him in Fargo.5 At Fargo King, along with land 
owners George Retheraeier, Maurice Redwing, and Leonard 
Griffen, spoke to Young for an half hour, despite constant 
interruptions, concerning the site selection. In the letter 
King explained that the Air Force had been interested in 
land in the Levant Township northwest of Grand Forks. The 
Hutterite Colony in the area had offered the Air Force the 
land for twenty-five dollars per acre, but the Mekinock site 
would cost the government "well over one million dollars."6 
Once again, he called on Young to help in the matter.
Even though King's clients did not object to the base in 
the county but only to its Mekinock site, the Grand Forks 
civic leaders became alarmed and took every chance to twist 
the issue in their favor. Officials in Grand Forks, as well 
as in Minot were convinced that the land owners would 
jeopardize the base and, subsequently, their political 
careers. On 11 January 1955 the Grand Forks Herald publish­
ed a report that the site had already been chosen at the 
Mekinock area, but it later retracted the story when the 
Air Force denied the claim.7 On 30 December editor 
Oppegard telegraphed Young that King represented only "four 
or five" of the land owners. Oppegard's statement was a
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gross misrepresentation of the facts.8
In addition to King, Young received telegrams from 
George Rethemeier and Matilda Nelson and a letter from T.A. 
and Vernon Thompson objecting to the site.9 Senator Langer 
also received a telegram from Nelson.10 Young informed the 
Thompsons he had "been doing a lot of work on [the] matter, 
but I don't know how successful I will be. I will do my 
best, however."11
While Young had maintained his neutrality in the 
selection of sites within the state, he did object to the 
Mekinock site and contacted the Air Force at King's request. 
He stated the land owners seem "in several respects [to] 
make a good case."12 He could not understand why the Air 
Force would desire the most productive and expensive land as 
opposed to the non-productive and cheap land chosen initial­
ly. In response, General Kelly replied "preliminary 
engineering studies of the [Rye Township] site have not been 
encouraging."13 He continued, "To provide a basis, there­
fore, for evaluation of engineering, construction, and other 
factors, we have been examining other sites in the general 
area." He finished by stating "the Air Force is extremely 
sympathetic with those persons who may be adversely affected 
by military requirements. We are making every endeavor to 
accomplish our objectives with as few dislocations and as 
little inconvenience to the public as possible."14
Young later wrote to King:
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"If the decision goes against us, which I certainly hope 
it doesn't, 1 doubt that it would be of any use to try 
to stop it by Congressional Committees. It may be a 
difficult thing to stop because Congress wants to get 
these bases in operation as soon as possible."15
Despite Young's efforts, on 26 February Secretary of the
Air Force Harold Talbott informed Young that a site had been
chosen in Township 152 North, Range 53 West (Mekinock).
Apparently, Township 154 North, Range 52 West (Levant) was
not feasible.16 He claimed that "the new site could be
developed more economically, resulting in an estimated
savings of approximately $1,000,000 in engineering and
presently programmed construction." Furthermore, "Soil and
terrain features are much more favorable for base
development at the new location." After receiving the
notice, Young telephoned King and informed him of the bad
17news.
In testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
Appropriations, General John Rodenhauser, Director of Real 
Property, explained that "test borings disclosed that the 
subsoil at the original site did not have the foundation­
bearing capacity that the new site had, where alluvial
deposits have built up a gravel base there and enable us to
1 8more cheaply erect our heavier structures."
The importance of the sub-soil could not be under­
estimated since the runways would be required to support the 
weight of the fighter and bomber aircraft. In addition, the 
SAGE block building had to be constructed on a heavy base
8 8
walls and floors designed to withstand a nuclear attack, 
which required a firm foundation.
Within Grand Forks County are a number of ancient beach 
areas "almost w oily composed of gravel" produced by Lake 
Agassiz.19 Whi e the changes in water height formed the 
numerous beacnes, the current and intensity of the wave 
motion created the size and gravel content of each beach.
The Emerado Beach is among the most distinct in the county 
standing eight to ten feet above the surrounding area and 
varying in width from one hundred feet to one-half mile.
The Corp used the eight to ten feet thick gravel sub-soil
of the Emerado Beach as a foundation for the runway and
2 nother heavy facilities.
Besides the advantage of locating the base over a gravel
sub-base, certain other soil characteristics also influenced
the ecision. Map 2 on the following page illustrates that
Grard Forks County is divided into five basic physiographic 
21 . . .regions. The Levant township is primarily composed of the
saline flats region with Ojata as the primary soil type, and
the Mekinock site is located in the Beach region with
Gardena as its primary soil type.
The characteristics of the Ojata soil are strong
alkalinity (7.4-9.0%), clay sub-soil, and very strong 
• • 2 2salinity (8-16). The soil also has a moderate shrink-swell 
potential. Soil and water features include high corrosion 
potential to uncoated steel and moderate potential to
(Unpublished Thesis, University o f North Dakota, 1959): 7 , 19. The map shows the f iv e  s o i l  ty"e areas within the counts. The three townships involved in  the s i t e  se le ctio n  orocess are squared o f f .  The Emerado Beach is  shown going through the countv by the dotted l in e .
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concrete, a high potential to frost heave, and a high water 
table of 0-1.0 foot with very slow infiltration (.06-.6 
inches per hour) making it conducive to flooding."3
The Gardena soil has good topsoil with a gravel-sand 
sub-soil, low salinity (less than 2) and low alkalinity
24(6.6-7.8%), good drainage, and low shrink-swell potential. 
Soil and water features include moderate corrosion to 
uncoated steel, low corrosion to concrete, and moderate 
infiltration rate with a four to six foot water table.25
Based on the roil characteristics and the gravel sub­
soil base at Mekinock, the Air Force made the correct 
decision in locating the base at the Mekinock site. The low 
shrink-swell potential would cause less damage to the runway 
and roads in the long run. Furthermore, the low salinity and 
alkalinity would reduce corrosion to both concrete and 
steel. The lower water table and higher infiltration rate 
would reduce flooding, which was more prevalent in the Ojata 
soil areas. The Air Force also chose to locate Minot Air 
Force Base on soil formed by glacial till with a low to 
moderate shrink-swell potential.20
According to the Air Force reasons for the changes, the 
Levant site would require higher construction and 
operational costs in the long term; whereas, the Mekinock 
site would require an initial high outlay of funds for land 
but this would be offset by lower construction and 
operational costs. If the Air Force had located on the poor
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soil, the long terra damage would have cost the Air Force 
more to repair the runway and other facilities than it 
had to pay in the higher price for the land initially.
Young now sought to dispel the rumors among the Grand 
Forks city leaders concerning his actions in the site 
selection. He wrote Amos Martin, Secretary of the Grand 
Forks Chamber of Commerce, "Apparently any explanation of my 
actions to you would be entirely useless," but Young went on 
to briefly explain his reasons.27 He objected to a site with 
much higher cost and the damage that would occur to a nearby 
turkey farm. He also protested that in the future the base 
might be abandoned and would be a terrible waste of good 
farm land. With the knowledge that the Air Force had 
selected the site, Martin decided to drop the matter and 
thanked Young for his help.28
But one last bout between city leaders and land owners 
took place in March. On 6 March editor Oppegard, speaking 
through a Herald editorial, called upon the land owners to 
make a sacrifice. He stated the land owners did not have 
all the information in the selection of the site. He 
continued, trying to convince the skeptical, "full 
consideration" had been given to the first site, but the 
second site was found better. On the 19th letters from King 
and James Veitch rejected Oppegard's call for a sacrifice 
and stated the standard reasons for the opposition. Both 
asked whether city officials would be willing to sacrifice
92
their homes and land, if the choice had been thrust upon 
them.30
While the site selection in Grand Forks County had 
created some problems, the Minot site proceeded on schedule. 
At first, speculation placed the base north of the city 
within Tatman Township, but the decision was not made until 
October, when the Air Force announced the base would be 
located primarily in the eastern part of Waterford Township. 
By 27 October five survey crews including a subgrade testing 
crew were in the area conducting tests and drilling over one 
hundred-thirty holes throughout the area.31
The Air Force then instructed the Corps of Engineers to 
create a Real Estate Planning Report which outlined the 
features of each site. The Real Estate Planning Report of 1 
November 1954 for Minot Air Force Base estimated the total 
land acquisition to be 3,961.19 acres at an average cost of 
$42.82 per acre totaling $169,631.32 The value of the 
buildings was $34,675 and the total cost which included 
severance damages, mineral rights, resettlement costs, and 
contingencies, would be $258,045 at $56.85 per acre.33 A 10 
percent ($1,868.30) loss in tax income would be felt by the 
state, county, township, and school districts.
The Minot base would be situated in Township 157 Ranges 
82 and 83, eleven miles north of Minot. The land was 
primarily utilized for grain and dairy production. There 
were twenty-one different land owners, while tenants worked
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65 percent of the land. Five houses were located on the 
land, with three occupied by the owners, one by a tenant, 
and the other vacant. Only two children attended a nearby 
school.
The land at Minot was divided into twenty-four tracts 
with ownership extending over forty years. The soil 
contained glacial till and was "very productive." The report 
considered accessibility "very good", with Highway 83 to the 
east, and listed a three-fourths mile electric line as the 
only relocation.34 In reference to underground minerals, the 
report stated that the nearest producing oil well was thirty 
miles away and the mineral rights were "negligible."
The Real Estate Planning Report for the Grand Forks site 
had a total of $570,950 for 5,385.61 acres.35 Of this 
amount, $398,790.75 went for purchasing the land, while 
$73,500 reimbursed the owners for improvements. An 
additional $76,500 went for damages and contingencies, and 
$7,500 applied to family relocation expenses. The loss in 
tax to the state, county, township and school districts 
would be substantial with a 25 percent or $4,912.74 loss 
annually.
The report stated that the $65,000 donated by the commu­
nity would be used to purchase land for sewage facilities.36 
The report considered transportation facilities ideal, with 
Highway 2 to the south and the Great Northern Railway in the 
vicinity. The site had thirty-four different tracts with
9 4
twenty-two land owners, of which ten were owner-operators. 
Ten houses were located on the land with five inhabited by 
owners, four by tenants, and one vacant. The soil was 
underlain with gravel but very productive. Seven miles of 
road, telephone lines, and electrical lines would have to be 
relocated.
In determining the value of the land at both Mekinock 
and Minot, the Corps examined previous land sales in the 
area.37 At Mekinock the Corps examined twenty sales but 
selected only seven to be used as a comparison. At Minot the 
Corps used nine sales within an eight mile radius to 
determine the value of the land.
The Air Force now encountered funding problems at the 
Grand Forks location. Expecting to purchase relatively, 
cheap land, the Air Force had only allocated sixteen 
thousand dollars for the land at Grand Forks. The Air Force 
thus requested additional funds of $493,000 on 27 June.
Grand Forks, meanwhile, modified its original offer of free 
land to an offer of sixty-five thousand dollars. The Air 
Force finally received the authority to reprogram funds 
during fiscal year 1956 to purchase any needed land.
The Air Force now had to acquire the land and purchase 
easements around the bases. The government offered the 
appraised value of the land to each land owner. At both 
sites nearly all the land owners turned down the offer, 
which opened the way for the government to begin condemning
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the land. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution entitled 
the land owners to the value of the land and damages in­
flicted by the taking? therefore, the land owners could 
contest the appraised value in court. A U.S. Marshal 
delivered Declarations of Taking to each land owner for the 
main portion of the land at both base sites.38
At the Mekinock site, land owners were told to surrender 
their land by 31 January 1956 and the Air Force deposited 
$343,360 at Fargo to pay for the land.39 The U.S. Treasury 
Department deposited the fifty thousand dollars Minot 
donated and the sixty five thousand offered by Grand Forks 
as Certificates of Deposit in the account entitled 
"Deposits, National Defense Conditional Gift Fund."40 The 
money was credited to the Air Force to be used in the land 
purchase. The U.S. District Court at Fargo issued checks to 
the land owners in the sum of the individual appraised 
value.
Meanwhile, construction crews began the occupation of 
both sites. On the 5th and 8th of February 1956 the Herald 
pictured James Vietch's house, now used by the builders as 
the main operations building.41 The construction crews also 
used Matilda Nelson's house for office space. Benson 
Construction Company handled clearing the land of thirteen 
groves of trees and over fifty-five rock piles. Ed Wolters, 
a civilian contractor, headed the construction for the Corps 
Engineers.
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Many of the families were upset over the decision to 
locate the base where they lived. Certainly, the Herald1s 
picturing of Veitch's former home rubbed salt in the wounds 
of those who had already been forced from their homes. At 
both locations land owners met to discuss the events and 
Rethemeier and Redwing visited owners in Minot to compare
• a?issues. Citizens at both locations felt trod upon by 
frightened city officials and the government. Many of the 
families had lived at the sites for over twenty years and 
some of their children had been born in the homes now 
destined for destruction.43
Following the Declaration of Taking, King and Daniel 
Letness of Grand Forks filed complaints against the 
government on the part of the land owners.44 Robert Vogel, 
U.S. Attorney for the District of North Dakota, and Gordon 
Thompson represented the government. King, Letness, and the 
Day, Stokes, Vaaler, and Gillig law firm represented the 
Grand Forks land owners. Federal District Judge Ronald N. 
Davies presided over the case. In the Minot court case, held 
in April 1957, the law firm of Ilvedson, Pringle, Herigstad, 
and Meschke represented the land owners, while Federal 
District Judge Dennis Donavan presided over the case.
The trials over land at both locations offered no "Perry 
Mason" theatrics, but rather followed a standard set 
of guidelines. Each involved the selection of appropriate 
jurors. Usually both sides would challenge several choices
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until the final jury of twelve members remained along with 
two alternates. The jurors viewed the land at the start of 
the trial. The judge informed both guides only to point out 
the land but not to provide additional information which 
might prejudice the jurors. George Kadlac and Vernon 
Botsford served as guides at the Mekinock site.45 The 
attorneys for land owners reminded the jurors that the 
land had been taken in 1955 and since that time extensive 
construction had taken place. When possible, the attorneys 
exhibited movies and photographs to illustrate the land 
before construction. Expert witnesses could be cross- 
examined only once by each side regarding their qualifi­
cations, and only three experts per side could testify on 
each tract of land. Each land owner took the stand on his 
own behalf and testified concerning the use of the land, 
improvements, and the value of the land. The government 
appraisers were also questioned by both sides regarding the 
land value. Clarence Swendseid and George Kadlac testified 
on behalf of the government concerning the Grand Forks site.46 
The trial would continue until each tract of land had been 
covered.
At Grand Forks three condemnation trials (Cases 3197,
3199, 3433) took place, while two land owners accepted the 
government's appraised value of their land. At Minot four 
trials (Cases 3121, 3139, 3172, 3269) took place, while 
three owners accepted the appraised value. At Minot the
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three land owners who sold their tracts for the appraised 
value were Robert Woodburn (62.12 acres for $2,875), Mabel 
Hathaway (320 acres for $15,040), and Alwine Jensen (7.16 
acres for $500) .4/ At Mekinock the two land owners who 
accepted the government terms were Harriet Olson (80 acres 
for $6,000) and Elsie Smith (60 acres for $5,100).48 Table 2
breaks down the land acquisition according to each court
49 , . . .case. Appendices B and C illustrate the individual land
tracts at both sites. The table also illustrates the
difference between the appraised value and the subsequent
jury award. Of the thirty-nine land owners who contested the
appraised value, thirty-seven received higher awards after
the trials.
TABLE 2
LAND ACQUISITION FOR MINOT AND GRAND FORKS 
AIR FORCE BASES, 1957-1959
Jury
Case Owner Tract Acres Award Appraised
3269. .Dorothy 0'Rourke.. .101.. .... 160.. .$6,700. ..$6,700
Ethel Yuly....... .108. .•••••80** . .4,676. ...3,600
3121. • Grace Bosard..... .104. .___160.. .$8,000. ..$6,500
Lucy Overshiner... .106. .....160.. . .8,875. ...7,155
G. R. New'........ .107. .___400.. .28,500. ..24,300
Ella Bryan.... . . ..109. .....160.. . .9,000. ..,7,650
Arthur Reinke.... .111...... 80. . .,4,700. ...3,800
Ralph Anderson.... .112.. ___360. . .21,220. ..16,900
William Lazarus... .113. .. . . .358 - , ,24,499. . .21,750
John Linton...... .119 . .--- 320.. . 19,500. . . 16,300
Elmer Michaletz... .121. ..... 80. . ..4,000. . .4,000
Ethel Yuly....... .122. ..... 80. . . .4,500. ...3,8°0
Walter Blume...... .123 . ....... 8 . . . ... 616. .... 6 00
Theodore Albresch. .124 . .---175. . .19,455. . . 17,885
Edwin Nelson..... .126. . ..4,600. ...3,800
3139.. A. A. Detlaff....114.......77. . .$10,162. .. $7,338
A. G. Olsen.......  116...... 78..... 3,780 . . , . 2,600
william Peters.... 117......478____4 7,670.. .41,000
Pearl Lawrence....118.......158 .... 12,066 .... 7,526
3172.. A. A. Detlaff....114.......102 . . . $10,065 . . . $6,034
3197. .John Whitnack..... 104......960. . .$97,483. .$67,950
James Veitch...... 106...... 160. .. .22,900. . .21,2 00
Mathilda Nelson___107...... 480____54,414. . .45,000
Leonard Griffen....108/116..390....51,093...36,250
Maurice Redwing....109..... 480....75,000...57,720
John Hall......... Ill...... 240____ 2 0,605. . .20,4 55





Edwin Osen........ 121.......80......6,520 . . . . 5,600
Mary King......... 127.......80......6,920 . . . . 5,800
3199 . .Vivian Osen....... 119.......80. ...$6,520...$5,600
334 3 ..Myra Foundation___  122.160...$13,627..$11,986
Margaret Hyslop....124..... 380....51,476...31,000
George Rethemeier. . 128...... 37.....6,322 .... 3,150
Fred Benson........129.55....10,399....5,500
Theodore Thompson..133..... 120 .... 25,751... 22,000
The jury-awarded sum also includes interest on the 
additional award. Redwing, Warnken, Johnson, Hall, and Mary 
King received compensation for plowing.50 Griffen, Moen, 
Nelson, Redwing, Thompson, and Veitch received additional 
compensation for buildings on their land at the Grand Forks 
site, while Abresch, Bryan, Lazarus, Linton, and New 
received compensation for buildings at the Minot site.51 
Structures on the land could be removed at the owner's 
expense or offered subsequently for sale by the government. 
At the Minot site forty-six buildings valued at $34,675 were 
removed and at Mekinock ninety-seven buildings valued at 
$73,5C0 had to be removed.
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The Air Force divided the fifty
1 0 0
thousand dollars Minot donated among five tracts of lands: 
104, $6,000; 111, $3,500; 112, $16,500; 113, $20,000; and 
117, $4,000.5J The $65,000 donated by Grand Forks was used 
to purchase a portion of John Whitnack's farm.54
Before the court cases began, the Corps of Engineers had 
already begun construction. The Corps faced problems with 
the climate and the sparse population. The climate impaired 
the work season, while the sparse population led to labor 
shortage problems.55 because of the calcium and chloride 
content in the underground water, the Corps contracted with 
Minot to obtain water from the Souris River and with Grand 
Forks to obtain water from the Red River of the North.
Since North Dakota frost could penetrate six feet, the Corps 
gave primary consideration to the runway construction. To 
alleviate "subgrade weakening and pavement heave," the 
runways had a base and pavement thickness of seventy-two 
inches.56 The Corps also elevated both runways above the 
surrounding area to prevent snow build-up. At Grand Forks, 
the Corps utilized a north-south beach ridge of the ancient 
Lake Agassiz. By placing the runway on top of the beach 
ridge, frost susceptibility decreased.
To what extent was the Air Force correct in changing the 
original location in Grand Forks County from the Levant site 
to the Mekinock site? The site in Grand Forks created more 
controversy than the Minot site for several reasons. Unlike 
Minot, the Air Force vacillated between various sites in the
1 0 1
county, which created a local situation similar to the 
previous state-wide controversy. The Grand Forks site was 
also more populated than the Minot site. Obviously, the Air 
Force did not take the Rye Township site seriously. Since it 
was but five miles from Grand Forks, the site did not meet 
the ten-to-fifteen mile criceria. The 17 June 1954 announce­
ment, which named the North Dakota base sites, contained 
another indication of the Air Force's intention. The 
statement said a site ten to fifteen miles northwest of the 
city would be selected. Even before the announcement the Air 
Fc h«. discarded the land Hansen had first offered.
There were several iinpor nt considerations in choosing 
the exact location in Grand Forks County. The Air Force had 
to find a site ten to fifteen miles from the city with road 
and railroad access and, preferably, north of the city but 
within the county. The North Dakota-Minnesota state border 
effectively eliminated sites to the east of Grand Forks, 
while the Turtle River and Kelly's Slough cut through the 
remaining portion of the county northwest of the city, thus 
limiting potential areas. At both sites, the Air Force had 
access to railroad and highway facilities. At Levant the 
Great Northern rail line and Highway 81 passed through the 
township, but at Mekinock, the Air Force could utilize 
Burlington Northern rail lines on the north and south and 
Highway 2 to the south.
With the transportation considerations examined, the
1 0 2
Air Force could now study both sites in more detail. As a 
result, the Corps conducted soil and sub-soil tests. After 
conducting extensive soil tests at each possible area, the 
Mekinock site was the only site feasible for construction.
Planned as a minimum twenty-five year permanent base, 
both Minot and Grand Forks have surpassed that time limit. 
Many mission and weapon system transitions have taken place 
at Grand Forks and Minot Air Force bases as technology has 
changed.
In January 1957 the 478th Fighter Group was activated at
Grand Forks and in December 1957 the Grand Forks Air Defense
Sector of NORAD was activated. On 13 August 1958 the first
of the two SAGE computers was installed. In September 1958
the 4133rd Strategic Wing of SAC was activated under the
command of the 15th Air Force as part of the dispersal
program. On 15 December 1959 the SAGE center became
operational; Map 3 on the following page shows the four U.S.
and two Pinetree radar stations in Manitoba in the Grand
Forks sector.57 In February 1960 the 905th Air Refueling
Squadron activated and the first of ten Boeing KC-135A
Stratotankers arrived in May. Also in May, the 18th FIS
transferred from Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan, to Grand Forks.58
The following month the first F-101B Voodoo "Blue Foxes" of
#the 18th FIS arrived to be equipped with nuclear missiles.
In 1962 the first B-52G arrived and was equipped with the 
nuclear AGM-28A Hound Dog missile. In February 1963 the
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M I N O T  AND GRAND FORKS A I R  D E F E N S E  S E C T O R S
LEGEND
A. Minot AFB SAGE S e c to r
1. Saskatoon  M ountain, Sa3k.
2 . Y ork ton , Sask .
3. Opheim AFS, Montana
4. Fortuna AFS, N.D.
5. M iles C ity  AFS, Montana
6. Sundance AFS, Wyoming
7. E llsw o rth  AFB, S.D .
8. D ickinson AFS, N.D.
9 . Minot AFS. N.D.
B. Grand Forks AFB SAGE S e c to r
1. G ypsu inv ille , M anitoba
2 . B eau se jo u r , M anitoba
3. F in ley  AFS, N.D.
4. Wadena AFS, M innesota
5. G e tty sbu rg  AFS, S.D .
6. C handler AFS, M innesota
Map Three. Adapted from SAGE Configuration Chart, Maxwell AFB H is to r ic a l Research Center, Alabama, May 1982; F ile  "A ir Force S ta tio n s ,"  received from Mark Morgan, Fort Worth, Texas.
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4133rd was redesignated the 319th Heavy Bombardment Wing and 
in July ADC turned the base over to SAC.
Following the establishment of the SAC bomb wing, the 
base soon began to undergo other transitions. In 1963 the 
SAGE center was shut down and the radar units were trans­
ferred to the SAGE center at Duluth International Airport,
,  C Q  ,Minnesota. In 1964 construction began on the LGM-30F 
Minuteman II missile complex and the 321st Strategic Missile 
Wing became operational in 1966. The 1970's and 1980's saw 
little overall operational change but was it time for 
replacing weapons. In February 1971 the 18th FIS was 
replaced with the 460th FIS equipped with F-106 Delta Darts, 
but almost immediately inactivated on 15 April 1971. In 1973 
the Minuteman II missiles were updated with 150 LGM-30G 
Minuteman Ill's. On 4 December 1986 the last B-52G departed 
and madeway for the first of the 17 Rockwell B-1B Lancer 
bombers which arrived in May 1987. The re-engined KC-135R 
replaced the ageing KC-135A model during 1986-87. Along with 
the new bombers and tankers, three Northrop T-38A's operate 
under the 64th Tactical Fighter Wing.
Minot Air Force Base activated in January 1957 and the 
Minot Air Defense Sector activated on 1 April 1959. Map 3 on 
the previous page shows the seven and two Pinetree radar 
stations in Saskatchewan tied into the Minot SAGE center. On 
1 February 1960 the 5th FIS "Spittin' Kittens" equipped with 
F-106's Delta Darts transferred from Suffolk County AFB, New
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York.60 In July 1962 ADC transferred the base to SAC with 
the 4136th Strategic Wing as the host unit. In February 
1963 the 4136th was redesignated the 450th Bombardment. Wing. 
As at Grand Forks, SAC operated B-52H's and KC-135A's in the 
dispersal program. On 15 August 1963 the Minot SAGE center 
shut down with the 5th FIS and radars transferring to the 
Great Falls AFB, Montana, SAGE center.61 Also in mid-1963, 
150 AM-8 OB Minuteman I launch facilities were completed and 
became operational with the activation of the 455th 
Strategic Missile Wing the following year. In 1971 Minot 
became the first base to have 150 LGM-30G Minuteman III 
missiles which replaced the Minuteman I.6t By 1970 the 
455th SMW had been replaced by the 91st SMW and the 5th BMW 
replaced the 450th. By the mid-1970's the total base 
population had reached over 22,000 with more family housing 
units than any other stateside Air Force installation 63 
Several years after receiving F-15 Eagle fighters, the 
5th FIS deactivated on 31 September 1988.
At Grand Forks the base acreage has continued to 
. . . . . 64expand past its initial boundaries. In 1965 the Air Force 
purchased eighty acres from Leonard Griffen for a family 
housing project. In 1974 another eighty acres was purchased 
for a sanitary land fill. In 1974 and 1978 the Air Force 
purchased another eighty acres for an additional housing 
project.
At Minot, the Air Force purchased 225 acres in 1957-58
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for a runway extension and, in 1960, 107 acres for a housing 
project and forty acres for sewage facilities.55 In 1974 the 
Air Force purchased fifty acres from Elmer Michaletz for a 
satellite basing system.
Both bases have had an enormous economic impact on the 
surrounding areas. The total economic impact of Grand Forks 
AFB on the surrounding region amounted to $225.4 million 
in 1989.66 Over 1,500 secondary jobs were created in 1989 in 
the Grand Forks area. The payroll for Grand Forks AFB in 
1989 exceeded $133.3 million.67 At Minot AFB the total 
economic impact reached $180 million with 1,088 secondary 
jobs created in 1989.58 The payroll for Minot AFB totaled 
over $128.7 million.69
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It has been over thirty years since the Air Force 
selected the sites for the Grand Forks and Minot bases. The 
myths concerning their establishment still persist. These 
include the significance of the land donations and the 
perception that Grand Forks and Minot "won" the bases due to 
their fast and strenous efforts. The grandiose claims of the 
Grand Forks Herald and Minot Daily News after the selection 
etched the myths in steel. The belief that Grand Forks 
provided all the land at the present base location and the 
establishment of the base was without complication are also 
false. These long held perceptions, accepted without 
question, are dissolved once the facts have been examined.
Misunderstanding, bad planning, and a lack of trust in 
the military resulted in the site selection controversy 
within North Dakota. The Air Force failed to understand the 
results of their short-sightedness in choosing to locate 
first at Bismarck and Fargo. They could not fully explain 
the military reasons for the final location, since most of 
the information was top secret and had not been released to 
the public. North Dakota citizens could only view the events 
within a scenario that lacked the important military
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requirements. The citizens also exhibited a distrust of the 
military, as if it were inconceivable that the Air Force 
would decide matters on a military basis and not political. 
In truth, a combination of military, safety, geographic, 
technological, operational, and geological influences 
determined the location of Grand Forks and Minot Air Force 
bases.
North Dakota was net unique in its site selection 
controversy. In the 1950's, the Air Force encountered 
problems over the selection and utilization of sites in 
other states. By far the greatest turmoil occurred in 
Michigan where the Air Force chose a site in Benzie County 
in north central Michigan to provide a defense in depth for 
the Detroit-Chicago area.’ But following opposition from a 
music camp fifteen miles away, the Air Force had to find 
another site. In the following confusion, Congressional 
meddling, and public outcry, the Air Force selected three 
sites, Cadillac, Kalkaska, and Manistee. With Congressional
leaders unable to agree on a site, the Air Force eventually
2dropped the project in 1956.
At Olmstead AFB, Pennsylvania, and Portland Inter­
national Airport, Oregon, the Air Force had to seek 
locations outside the cities when city leaders and the Air 
Force could not agree on proposed expansion of the 
existing airports.3 After being forced out of O'Hare 
International Airport, Illinois, because of over-crowding,
115
the Air Force established Richard-Bong AFB in Wisconsin. 
Controversy also followed the site selection of Grandview 
AFB, Missouri.
When the Air Force announced the sites of the North 
Dakota bases, they also announced the selection of a site at 
Glasgow, Montana. The Air Force had selected the general 
Glasgow-Miles City area in Montana in February 1954, but 
eventually chose the more northern location of Glasgow. 
Initially, they chose to use the city airport, which had 
been used during World War II. But then, just as in North 
Dakota, they sought a site outside the city. As in North 
Dakota, Colonel Munns visited the city in February and May 
asking the city for a resolution.6 Glasgow also provided 
the Air Force with $34,500 for the purchase of land to the 
north of the city.7
Despite the constant operational changes, the basic 
landscape of the bases has remained the same. Standing to 
the northwest of Grand Forks Air Force Base near George 
Rethemeier's farm, one can view the length of the nearly 
three mile runway with the tails of the aircraft sticking 
into the air. It does rot take much imagination to see the 
landscape as it used to be before the base— the houses with 
the trees surrounded by fields of growing wheat. The former 
serenity has now been replaced by a small city. The same 
images appear when one looks at Minot Air Force Base from 
Highway 83 as an occasional B-52 lumbers overhead, as they
, 4
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have done for over thirty years.
At the Mekinock site which had the highest population 
and greatest dislocation, remnants of the former landscape 
still remain. On the base, Maurice Redwing's barn still 
stands near the new multi-million dollar B-1B three-bay 
hangar; it is now used as the base horse stables. To the 
west, the foundation is all that remains of the Cooper 
School and to the south across Highway 2, the abandoned 
facilities of the Myra Turkey farm still stand. Most of the 
former land owners moved to farms close to their former home 
site.
A former land fill on Grand Forks Air Force Base is no 
longer discernible to the base personnel driving by it 
each day. The SAGE building now houses the 321st Strategic 
Missile Wing Headquarters and few even know of the former 
SAGE mission of the base. The land purchased to build a 
cross-wind runway, now lies idle with weeds. The former 
small village of Emerado one mile south of the base has now 
expanded northward.
Likewise, Minot has seen expansion north of the 
city reaching slowly out to the base. Lynch Church in the 
northeast corner of the base was saved from destruction by 
being just outside the area acquired by the government. As 
at Grand Forks, a secondary runway was not built, and the 
SAGE building houses the base headquarters. Theodore 
Abresch's buildings were bulldozed under to make way for the
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runway. Base family nousing units now stand where William 
Lazarus's house used to be, and bombers and tankers are 
parked on the alert pad over the site of John Linton's home. 
Meanwhile, base personnel leisurely play golf across his 
former farm.
Both bases are symbols of a by-gone era and were 
constructed during those few years when the Air Force feared 
another surprise aircraft attack like Pearl Harbor. The 
surprise attack never materialized and in its place the fear 
of an ICBM attack arose. North Dakota's strategic location 
has made it possible for the continuance of operations at 
both bases. Since the Air Force switched from air defense to 
strategic offense, only a few short years after the bases 
were established, the bases became central locations for 
long-range bombers and ICBM's. Grand Forks has now been 
selected to receive the LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile. If 
the Air Force is allowed to complete the project, more 
land will be required, once again disrupting the lives of 
the surrounding farmers.
With budget cuts in defense spending and easing of Cold 
War tensions, the fate of the two North Dakota bases remains 
uncertain. As the Soviet threat decreases, so does the need 
for either of the expensive bases. As the foundation upon 
which both bases were built crumbles, the Grand Forks and 
Minot bases may become empty fixtures on the North Dakota 
prairie and monuments to a past era in history.
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A P P E N D I X  A
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS
ADC Air Defense Command
ADS Air Defense Sector
ADSEC Air Defense Scientific Engineering Committee
AFB Air Force Base
ANG Air National Guard
BOMARC Boeing and Michigan Aeronautical Research Center
CONAD Continental Air Defense
DEW Distant Early Warning
FIS Fighter Interceptor Squadron
I CBM Inter-continental Ballistic Missile
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSC National Security Council
SAC Strategic Air Command
SAGE Semi-automatic Ground Environment
*Note: LASHUP is not an acronym.
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MINOT AIR FORCE BASE LAND TRACTS
•  Buildings
Adapted from Land Acquisition Map, Minot Air Force Base, Real Estate 
U,S. Army Corns of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska.
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